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ARTICLES
FUNCTION OVER FORM:
BRINGING THE FIXATION REQUIREMENT INTO
THE MODERN ERA
Megan Carpenter* & Steven Hetcher**
This Article examines the ways that contemporary creativity challenges
copyright’s fixation requirement. In this Article, we identify concrete
problems with the fixation requirement, both practically and in light of the
fundamental purpose and policy behind copyright law, and argue for a
change that would amend the fixation requirement to better function in the
modern era.
Specifically, we conclude that a fair appraisal of the justifications for the
fixation requirement provides little, if any, rationale for fixation except to
the extent that fixation helps to separate idea from expression in
determining the “metes and bounds” of creative expression. Recent case
law analyzing the transitory works exclusion in particular demonstrates
that this component of the fixation requirement has become an ineffective
demarcation of what it means to fix a work in the modern era and provides
little guidance for statutory interpretation. We reason that dropping the
transitory duration exclusion for copyrightability would enable fixation to
serve its essential purpose while not discriminating against important
strains of contemporary creativity. Furthermore, removing the transitory
works exclusion would better equip copyright law to reflect the purposes of
the Intellectual Property Clause in the U.S. Constitution. Despite these
considerations, if dropping the exclusion for transitory works is not
practically feasible, we argue that it is nevertheless desirable to allow a
flexible interpretation of statutory language in light of the purposes of
copyright and allow transitory works to come into a safe harbor from the
general fixation requirement for copyrightability under the aegis of the
Visual Artists Rights Act.
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There is a tension between the law and the evolution of ideas in modern
or avant garde art; the former requires legislatures to taxonomize artistic
creations, whereas the latter is occupied with expanding the definition of
what we accept to be art. . . . In other words, the “plain and ordinary”
meanings of words describing modern art are still slippery.1
Judge David H. Coar

INTRODUCTION
Art is an important aspect of human creativity. As such, and as
recognized in the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
copyright has long sought to promote the creation of artistic works. This
proposition seems beyond cavil. It is generally agreed that the purpose of
copyright is to encourage creation. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that
the “philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”2 Indeed, it takes
someone trained in copyright law not to suppose naturally that art should be
one of copyright’s main priorities, since it is conventional to think of art as
socially beneficial. Great artists are celebrated, and many people expend
significant effort to personally experience their works.
Art has been federally funded in the United States since the Great
Depression, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the Public Works of
Art Project and the Federal Art Project, which provided jobs for artists until
the beginning of World War II.3 In 1965, Congress created the National
Endowment for the Arts, which has given more than $4 billion in grants to
arts organizations.4 Support for the arts remains alive and well today. At
the 2009 reopening of the American wing of the Metropolitan Museum of
Art, First Lady Michelle Obama urged,
The arts are not just a nice thing to have or to do if there is free time or if
one can afford it. Rather, paintings and poetry, music and fashion, design
and dialogue, they all define who we are as a people and provide an
account of our history for the next generation.5

Art displays constantly changing norms. There is a general trend to
expand the genres and media in which artists create further and further
away from paint on a canvas. Each new era of art has pushed the
1. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
29, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
2. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
3. MARTIN R. KALFATOVIC, THE NEW DEAL FINE ARTS PROJECTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY,
1933–1992, at xxi–xxv (1994).
4. See National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-209, 79 Stat. 845, 846–47 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 951–960 (2012)); About the NEA,
NAT’L ENDOWMENT ARTS, http://www.nea.gov/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
5. Michelle Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at the Ribbon Cutting Ceremony for the
Metropolitan Museum of Art American Wing (May 18, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-first-lady-ribbon-cutting-ceremonymetropolitan-museum-art-american-wing.
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boundaries of both viewers’ diverse tastes and the law responsible for
protecting those tastes. Since the impressionist era, artists have developed
new movements in art, including expressionism, cubism, fauvism,
surrealism, abstract expressionism, and postmodernism.6 Artists affiliated
with these twentieth century movements rejected representation and instead
produced images whose subjects were less easily identified.7 Late
twentieth-century and present-day artists have, however, shifted back
towards recognizable content displaced into new contexts.8 Appropriation
and conceptual works often intend to depict commonplace images whose
meaning depends on the viewer’s response to these sorts of images.9 Many
recent important pieces challenge traditional notions of museum display.10
The “essential fairness of copyright law” reflects a sense that creative
works equally deserve protection from unauthorized copying.11 However,
as Charles Cronin has noted, “Since the late nineteenth century, when
Impressionist painters challenged established tenets of Western art, works
associated with many artistic movements that followed have . . . become
increasingly problematic in terms of eligibility for copyright protection
under U.S. law.”12 This is especially true for contemporary art that includes
natural matter, performances, and pieces that are intentionally
impermanent.13 The Seventh Circuit in Kelley v. Chicago Park District14
recently highlighted the tension between contemporary art and copyright
law when it noted that “not all conceptual art may be copyrighted.”15 This
analysis must be tested by examining the limits of what works are
copyrightable and, specifically, whether the fixation requirement, as it is
interpreted by courts, provides a reasonable constraint on copyrightability.
In addition, it is worth considering whether works of contemporary art that
do not otherwise meet copyrightability requirements should be eligible for
moral rights protection under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 199016
(VARA).

6. Charles Cronin, Dead on the Vine: Living and Conceptual Art and VARA, 12 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209, 223 (2010).
7. Id.; see also Denis Dutton, Has Conceptual Art Jumped the Shark Tank?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2009, at A27 (describing contemporary conceptual art as “works we admire
not for skillful hands-on execution by the artist, but for the artist’s creative concept”).
8. Cronin, supra note 6, at 224–25.
9. Id. at 225.
10. See id. (“One might have to step beyond the walls of the museum to experience
many works of Conceptual art created over the past fifty years.”).
11. Katie Sykes, Towards a Public Justification of Copyright, 61 U. TORONTO FAC. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2003) (quoting Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at
134).
12. Cronin, supra note 6, at 213.
13. Id. at 213–14.
14. 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
15. Id. at 304.
16. Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 106A (2012)).

2014]

FUNCTION OVER FORM

2225

As the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Kelley indicates, copyright fails to
promote art in one very important respect17: it fails to adequately protect
contemporary art that is not “fixed” according to current interpretations of
fixation under the Copyright Act.18 Fixation, according to the Copyright
Act, requires that works are able to be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”19 Under this
definition, not only are important strains of contemporary art “unfixed”
because they are transitory in nature, but also because they often make a
point of incorporating elements of change over time. Dynamic elements of
artistic works are not merely an unintended consequence but rather a deeper
artistic feature often integral to the meaning of this art. Given the
seriousness with which society appreciates, values, and pursues fine art, it is
puzzling, and deserving of an explanation, that copyright law implies that
certain art is somehow not worthy of encouragement—in this case, art that
does not satisfy the fixation requirement under interpretations of section
101 of the Copyright Act.
Would not Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes turn in his grave to know that
his most famous contribution to copyright doctrine—the Bleistein
principle—is being controverted, and increasingly so, as nontraditional
unfixed art burgeons?20 In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,21
Holmes warned that it is bad copyright policy for judges to determine the
quality of art.22 He noted that the artists Francisco Goya and Édouard
Manet were not appreciated in their time by society and thus likely not to be

17. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305–06 (discussing the requirement that being “fixed” is
necessary for copyright).
18. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012),
[a] work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this
title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
19. Id.
20. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903); see also
Russ VerSteeg, Jurimetric Copyright: Future Shock for the Visual Arts, 13 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 125, 134–35 (1994) (“There is something about the thought of a judge trying to
evaluate an artist’s creativity that is troubling.”).
21. 188 U.S. 239.
22. Id. at 251. Because each time period creates its own criteria, judges may not be
sufficiently sophisticated to appreciate a specific work at a given time, particularly avantgarde works: “Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned
the new language in which their author spoke.” Id. at 251. On the other hand, judges may be
too educated to appreciate the art desired by the general public. As one art critic noted:
Nothing about 20th century art is as disturbing as its warring factions, its
schisms and its accusations of heresy and illegitimacy. The battle for modernism
is far from over as long as large segments of our population continue to maintain
that something is art only if it approximates the appearance of physical reality, or
if it follows the strict rules of tradition. And the battle for reason in art is not over
as long as representational art is considered regressive or irrelevant by its very
nature.
THEODORE F. WOLFF, THE MANY MASKS OF MODERN ART 2 (1989).
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appreciated by a judge either.23 Holmes’s remarks have been cited for a
variety of propositions, but for present purposes, his use of Goya and Manet
as examples illustrates that copyright should not seek to discern socially
worthy art from art that is not, lest a potentially great artist go
underappreciated. Vincent Van Gogh is a classic example of an artist who
enjoyed very little success during his lifetime (selling only one painting,
some believe),24 but whose works became some of the most popular and
influential in the twentieth century, including two paintings that are listed in
the top ten most expensive paintings of all time.25 Fear of excluding art that
may be socially valuable informs the argument that copyright should
protect all art, which is a social good.
The traditional view is that copyright incentivizes creation. But because
copyright law protects only “fixed” art, it fails to adequately incentivize an
important form of contemporary art: art that is “unfixed” according to the
strictures of the Copyright Act.
As the following discussion will demonstrate, this conclusion could lead
to a significant policy shift: elimination of the fixation requirement. This
Article, however, concludes that fixation is an important element of
copyright law because it serves a functional purpose of delimiting idea from
expression. Unfortunately, many works of art are embodied in a particular
expression, yet have transitory duration; those works of art are not
copyrightable because they are not “fixed” under the Copyright Act. Our
normative argument, in sum, is that the “transitory duration” exclusion
should be abolished from the statutory definition of fixation. This would
allow copyright law to protect important classes of contemporary art while
retaining the functional benefits of the fixation requirement.26 As an
alternative, this Article proposes a policy change that is narrowly tailored to
address the immediate problem of a lack of copyright protection for certain
forms of contemporary art. Such a policy change is not without important
precedent in U.S. copyright law. The most significant example is, of
course, section 106A: the moral rights provision of the Copyright Act,
which protects works of visual art.27 If eliminating the transitory duration
23. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
24. Vasko Kohlmayer, The Red Vineyard: The Only Picture Vincent van Gogh Ever
Sold, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2011), http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/
vasko-kohlmayers-globe/2011/aug/2/red-vineyard-picture-vincent-van-gogh-sold.
25. See Jethro Mullen, New Van Gogh Painting Discovered: ‘Sunset at Montmajour,’
CNN (Sept. 9, 2013, 5:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/09/world/europe/netherlandsvan-gogh-new-painting/ (“During the art market boom of the late 1980s and early 1990s,
three of van Gogh’s works succeeded each other as the most expensive paintings ever sold:
‘Sunflowers’ for $39.9 million, ‘Irises’ for $53.9 million and ‘Portrait of Dr. Gachet’ for
$82.5 million.”).
26. According to the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection subsists in “original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). This
statute establishes the requirements for copyrightable subject matter. The ones at issue for
contemporary art are (1) fixation and (2) authorship.
27. Id. § 106A.
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requirement has negative policy implications, then removing the
requirement in the more limited domain of contemporary art, perhaps by
means of amending section 106A, may nonetheless improve on the status
quo.
One response to these proposals might be to observe that both would
seem to suffer from the impossible task of defining art. As will be
discussed below, this issue is not to be minimized. Nevertheless, section
106A functions despite limited scope of coverage; “visual art” and vague
tests, such as “recognized stature” of the work, determine the basic scope of
the coverage. While section 106A broadens the scope of owners’ rights, it
does not affect the test for ownership rights in the first place. By contrast,
eliminating the transitory duration limitation for contemporary art opens up
a new frontier for claiming private ownership of highly original and
important contemporary art. Restricting the policy shift to the subject
matter of section 106A would apply to works that are “visual works” of
“recognized stature.”28
The discussion proceeds as follows. First, this Article examines types of
contemporary art that are not protected by copyright under the terms of the
statute. This Article then explores why copyright law includes a fixation
requirement. The main arguments in favor of the fixation requirement that
this Article considers are: First, that fixation is an implied requirement
under the U.S. Constitution. Second, that fixation serves an important
evidentiary role in copyright law. And third, that fixation plays a role as a
gatekeeper for a low originality standard.
This Article concludes that a fair appraisal of these arguments provides
little or no rationale for the fixation requirement—except to the extent that
fixation helps separate idea from expression and determine the “metes and
bounds” of creative expression. Dropping the “transitory duration”
exclusion would enable fixation to serve this essential purpose while not
discriminating against important strains of contemporary art. Recent case
law analyzing the transitory duration limitation demonstrates that the
requirement has become an ineffective gauge of what it means to “fix” a
work in a digital age, and provides little guidance for statutory
interpretation. Removing the requirement would better align copyright law
with the purposes of the Intellectual Property Clause in the U.S.
Constitution.
If, alternatively, one concludes that dropping the transitory duration
requirement is unfeasible, this Article argues that the Visual Artists’ Rights
Act should provide, for transitory works, a safe harbor from the fixation
requirement. In sum, this Article explores two ways to “fix” the fixation
requirement for contemporary art: First, by moving away from the “more
than a transitory duration” test. Second, by amending VARA to protect
statutorily “unfixed” works of contemporary art.

28. See id.
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I. IMPORTANT STRAINS OF CONTEMPORARY ART ARE NOT PROTECTED
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Works that do not receive copyright protection because they do not
satisfy the fixation requirement represent an important segment of
contemporary art. Significant and influential contemporary artists create
entire bodies of work that are never fixed under the terms of the Copyright
Act. Mainstream contemporary art often emphasizes process over product,
where the process itself defines the core of the art, and the art does not
result in some tangible “product.” These works span various categories
covered by copyright, including, inter alia, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works, pantomime and choreography, and dramatic works.
A. Sculpture with Natural Media
Natural media is commonly used as a tool of expression in contemporary
art. Indeed, land art has developed a prominence in major museums; the
Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles, for example, curated an
exhibition in 2012 called “Land Art to 1974,” which purported to be the
first large-scale, historical-themed exhibition to feature land art before it
became a fully institutionalized category of modern art.29 The show
included over eighty artists and projects from around the world.30
Andy Goldsworthy, a British artist living in Scotland, is one of the most
famous contemporary land artists.31 He uses exclusively natural objects,
incorporating materials such as wood, stone, and ice with tools such as
thorns, saliva, and water to create temporary and constantly changing works
that explore themes of time, destruction and decay, rebirth, and the natural
environment.32 Both the viewer and the environment become participants
in the art piece itself. Goldsworthy describes his work as follows:
Movement, change, light, growth and decay are the lifeblood of nature,
the energies that I try to tap through my work. I need the shock of touch,
the resistance of place, materials and weather, the earth as my source.
Nature is in a state of change and that change is the key to understanding.
I want my art to be sensitive and alert to changes in material, season and
weather. Each work grows, stays, decays. Process and decay are implicit.
Transience in my work reflects what I find in nature.33

In this passage, the artist elegantly invokes transience as key to his artistic
approach. Works such as Goldsworthy’s are not fixed under the Copyright
Act because they are of “transitory duration.” One ephemeral piece that
Goldsworthy creates in different environments and with different materials
begins with construction of a cairn on the shoreline between the ebb and
29. See Ends of the Earth: Land Art to 1974, MOCA, http://www.moca.org/landart/
(follow “About the Exhibition” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
30. Id.
31. Andy Goldsworthy, CASS SCULPTURE FOUND., http://www.sculpture.org.uk/artist/
119/andy-goldsworthy (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
32. Id.
33. Andy
Goldsworthy,
MORNING
EARTH,
http://www.morning-earth.org/
ARTISTNATURALISTS/AN_Goldsworthy.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
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flow of the tide.34 Goldsworthy must complete this structure in a very
limited amount of time according to the tide.35 When the tide flows back in
the work evolves further. For a cairn made of sticks, the tide may carry it
out to sea where it stays together for a time but gradually begins wearing
away.36 For a cairn made of stones, the tides may beat against it as it wears
down over the ensuing hours.37 In another piece, Goldsworthy collects
leaves and attaches them together with thorns in a long serpentine shape.38
He sends this wending serpent down a river, where the leaves interact with
each other, the current, and the rocks above and below, in a dialogue with
the natural environment. Throughout the progression of the piece, the
leaves break apart in segments and return to the earth.
The core of each of these pieces of art lies in the process and effect of
constant change. Goldsworthy’s art is important—not just under the
Bleistein principle—but as recognized by contemporary critics: he has won
both national and international awards; he has made temporary installations
in some of the world’s leading museums; and he has created commissioned
works in countries around the world.39
Goldsworthy’s ephemeral art is unfixed under section 101 of the
Copyright Act because it focuses on the transitory duration of nature.
Goldsworthy photographs or videotapes each work once at a certain
moment in the process, seeking to show the piece “at its height, marking the
moment when the work is most alive.”40 While “[t]here is an intensity
about a work at its peak that [he hopes] is expressed in the image,”41 even if
aspects of process and decay are somehow implicit, the digital image or
stream is not the art itself. While such photographs have the effect of
“fixing” the work for copyright purposes, the work itself remains unfixed
according to the statutory language. Any fixation of the piece, as that is
understood in copyright terms, is merely representational of the piece rather
than the piece itself—a fixation by proxy. To highlight the distinctiveness
of Goldworthy’s brand of creation in this respect, contrast this situation
with, for instance, the Mona Lisa, in which the fixed work is the work.
Other artists working with natural media suffer a similar fate under the
Copyright Act. James Turrell works in the media of light and space. He is
one of the most critically acclaimed artists working today and has received
both Guggenheim and MacArthur fellowships; critics have described him as

34. Campus Sculpture Tour: Andy Goldsworthy, GRINNELL COLL., http://web.grinnell.
edu/faulconergallery/CampusArt/goldsworthy.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
35. See id.
36. RIVERS AND TIDES: WORKING WITH TIME (Mediopolis Films 2004).
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See Goldsworthy, Andy, NAT’L GALLERY ART, http://www.nga.gov/content/ngaweb/
Collection/artist-info.28027.html?artistId=28027&pageNumber=1 (last visited Mar. 25,
2014). See generally Andy Goldsworthy, supra note 33.
40. Stacey Trujillo, Andy Goldsworthy, 3D RES. BLOG, http://sculptureresearch.
wordpress.com/andy-goldsworthy (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
41. Id.
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one of the “most multifaceted artists of our time.”42 His installations in
museums and galleries use the medium of light to make apparently solid
objects seem to be hung from walls or suspended in air.43 While pieces may
appear to be made of matter, they are comprised of light and ephemeral in
nature. He explains, “I like to use light as a material, . . . but my medium is
really perception. I want you to sense yourself sensing. To see yourself
seeing. To be aware of how you are forming the reality you see.”44 In
1980, the Whitney Museum of American Art featured an exhibition that
became well known because a visitor to the museum tried to lean against
one of Turrell’s pieces and fell through it, breaking her wrist.45
Turrell is renowned for creating skyspaces that enclose the participant to
control the perception of light and space.46 He constructs an environment,
often with an opening in the ceiling and benches along the walls, carefully
manufactured to frame light in a certain way.47 The art takes place not just
through the medium of the physical structure but in the constantly fluid
space between perception and reality. Turrell explains, “I want to put you
directly in front of light, so you see it with your own eyes, not through my
eyes.”48 Turrell’s art focuses on “light as a physical presence, a material in
its own right, not just something that illuminates the rest of the world.”49
Like Goldsworthy, Turrell’s inclusion of ephemeral natural media may
preclude copyright protection for his works per se. The dynamic nature of
his art would likely fail to satisfy the fixation requirement because of the
transitory works exclusion. While he can fix his works by proxy, the works
themselves—no matter how important to the art world or respected by
critics—arguably remain outside the realm of copyright.
B. Performance Art/Pantomime
Marina Abramović is a third example of a contemporary artist seeking to
avoid traditional, object-based art materials such as paint and canvas that
create a distance between the artist and the audience. Abramović has
chosen to cut out the middleman by using her own body as the medium for
her visual art. She has had solo shows at major museums in the United
States and Europe and has also participated in large-scale exhibitions such
as the Venice Biennale and the Whitney Biennial, winning the Golden Lion
Award at the Venice Biennale in 1997 for her video installation and

42. Michael Govan, James Turrell, INTERVIEW, June 2011, at 100, 104. See generally
James Turrell, ART 21, http://ec2-75-101-145-29.compute-1.amazonaws.com/art21/artists/
james-turrell (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
43. Paul Trachtman, James Turrell’s Light Fantastic, SMITHSONIAN MAG., May 2003, at
86, 88.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 90.
46. See Govan, supra note 42, at 105.
47. Trachtman, supra note 43, at 90.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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performance piece entitled Balkan Baroque.50 In 2004, Abramović
received an honorary doctorate from the Art Institute of Chicago.51 In
2010, the Museum of Modern Art in New York (MoMA) selected her
works for a major retrospective exhibition.52 At the MoMA retrospective,
which involved a simultaneous display of several of her works, she was
only able to perform one piece; thus, more than forty other artists, under her
intense training, reperformed pieces of hers throughout the museum.53 It
was the first live reperformance of her works by other people ever
undertaken in a museum setting.54
Abramović herself performed a piece entitled The Artist Is Present, in
which she sat in a chair for six days a week, seven hours a day, during each
day that the museum was open between March 14 and May 31, 2010.55
People who attended the museum were invited to participate in the art by
sitting in a chair opposite her for a duration of their choosing, thus
contributing to the creation of the art piece itself.56 Approximately 1,400
people came to participate in the piece, including celebrities such as Sharon
Stone, Bjork, Isabella Rossellini, Lou Reed, Rufus Wainwright, and
Christiane Amanpour.57 The exhibition was immensely popular; the
MoMA estimates that half a million people visited all or part of the
retrospective, and a live feed on their website had close to 800,000 hits
before the show closed.58 A Flickr site that contains headshots of every
person who came to sit with Abramović was accessed close to 600,000
times.59
From Goldsworthy to Turrell to Abramović, from the earth to the sky to
the body within, these artists and their media are not isolated examples but
50. See Maria Abramović, SEAN KELLY GALLERY, http://www.skny.com/artists/marinaabramovi/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The Artist Is Present:
Marina Abramović, MOMA, http://www.moma.org/
interactives/exhibitions/2010/marinaabramovic/retreat_participants.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2014).
54. Marina Abramović: The Artist Is Present, MOMA, http://www.moma.org/visit/
calendar/exhibitions/965 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
55. Marina Abramović: The Artist Is Present—Portraits, MOMA, http://www.moma.
org/interactives/exhibitions/2010/marinaabramovic/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
56. A series of posts featuring videos, photographs, and interviews with the artist herself
and some of the audience members and participants are available at the MoMA blog
Inside/Out, MoMA, http://www.moma.org/explore/inside_out/category/marina-abramovic
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014). The artist herself noted that people sat with her for varying
lengths of time, from two minutes to at least 391 minutes. Katie Notopoulos, Marina
Abramović Made Me Cry, http://marinaabramovicmademecry.tumblr.com/ (last visited Mar.
25, 2014) (showcasing pictures taken at the MoMA exhibition of audience members who
cried while participating, along with the length of time they spent across from the artist); see
also Jim Dwyer, Confronting a Stranger, for Art, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, at MB1; Marina
Abramović: The Artist Is Present—Portraits, supra note 55 (featuring a video with portraits
of each person who participated in the piece).
57. Holland Cotter, 700-Hour Silent Opera Reaches Its Finale at MoMa, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 2010, at C1.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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represent strong currents in the contemporary arts world. The list could go
on and on. Another example is Richard Long, who is a painter,
photographer, and winner of the Turner Prize on multiple occasions.60 His
piece called A Line Made by Walking is one of his most famous. For that
piece, he walks and walks over the same land and makes a line.61 The art,
as he describes it, is not the line itself but the finite process of creating an
impression in the earth, as his feet and the earth and his thoughts, the
heaviness or lightness of his step, meet time and again. In the end, there is
a line—but the line is not the art, the process is the art.62 Despite these
artists’ acclaim, their work is not copyrightable. These artists’ dynamic,
rather than static, use of natural materials prevents their works from being
fixed under section 101 of the Copyright Act.
C. Sculpture with Living Materials
Numerous artists have begun to create works that incorporate live
elements from nature. These works are part of a new movement called
bioart that explores the intersection of art and science. Bioart is composed
of living things, such as live tissues, bacteria, or living organisms, or is
created in conjunction with living things.63 The works are produced in
laboratories and artists’ studios. As Brooke Oliver explains, “In some
ways, these pieces are one-of-a-kind originals like traditional sculpture, yet
they grow and change in response to their controlled environments.”64
Bioartists use sculptures and images that incorporate bioengineered living
forms to bring about ethical, social, and esthetic inquiry.65
Bioart can take a wide variety of forms. Victimless Leather was a tiny
jacket made up of a biodegradable polymer matrix in the shape of a doll’s
jacket covered in a layer of living tissue made of embryonic stem cells
taken from mice.66 By growing living tissue into a leather-like material, the
artists hoped to start discussion of the moral implications of wearing parts

60. See Richard Long, GUGGENHEIM, http://www.guggenheim.org/new-york/collections/
collection-online/show-full/bio/?artist_name=Richard%20Long (last visited Mar. 25, 2014);
Richard Long Artist Biography, TATE, http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artists/richard-long1525/text-artist-biography (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). Long has also been nominated
multiple times for the Turner Prize. 20 Years of the Turner Prize, GUARDIAN,
http://arts.theguardian.com/pictures/0,,1062817,00.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
61. Richard Long Artist Biography, supra note 60.
62. See id.
63. GEORGE GESSERT, GREEN LIGHT: TOWARD AN ART OF EVOLUTION 1 (2010).
Examples of life forms that have been utilized in art include: grasses, trees, bacteria, fungi,
fish, frogs, fluorescing tadpoles, crabs, fly larvae, algae, horses, honeybees, pigeons, plant
seeds and bedding plants, ants, protozoa, spiders, earthworms, maggots, caterpillars and
butterflies, orchids, elephants, dogs, chickens, silkworms, culinary herbs, turtles, mice, and
scorpions. Id. at 2.
64. Brooke Oliver, New Media Art Works: BioArt, Digital Media, Installations &
CopyLeft 6 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.osrfirm.com/bios/
pubs/New%20Media%20Paper%20071408.pdf.
65. Id. at 1.
66. John Schwartz, Museum Kills Live Exhibit, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2008, at F3.
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of dead animals and humans’ responsibility to other living things.67 The
piece garnered great attention when the MoMA curator had to decide to
“turn off the life-support system for the work, basically ‘killing’ it.”68 As
the curator put it, “I’ve always been pro-choice and all of a sudden I’m here
not sleeping at night about killing a coat . . . That thing was never alive
before it was grown.”69
Many other artists incorporate living elements into their pieces. Damien
Hirst, incidentally said to be the world’s richest living artist,70 has created a
work that manifests an entire life cycle, from gestation through death. In
his work A Thousand Years, maggots hatch inside a white box, turn into
flies, and feed on a severed cow’s head on the floor of a glass case.71 An
electric fly killer hangs inside the case from above; hatched flies buzz
about, some meeting their end through electrocution, and some surviving to
continue the cycle of the piece.72 There is no question that there is an
expression in Hirst’s piece, a “work,” but yet the dynamic nature of the
piece precludes copyright.
Artist George Gessert explores the overlap between art and genetics. His
exhibits often involve hybridizing plants, often irises, or documentation of
breeding projects.73 Gessert is predominantly interested in plant aesthetics
and the many ways in which human aesthetic preferences affect plant
evolution.74 Eduardo Kac also generated novel life forms in a work entitled
Alba, a rabbit that fluoresces green under a specific blue light.75 He did so
by implanting the rabbit with a green fluorescent protein gene from a type
of jellyfish.76
To expect copyright to be neither under- nor overinclusive is
unreasonable. And copyright law may rightfully exclude certain forms of
art at the margins—artists will always push the envelope beyond the
boundaries of copyrightability. The types of art discussed in this Article,
however, are particularly notable because they are at the forefront of an
important movement in contemporary art emphasizing process over
product, are created by some of the most well-respected artists in the world,
and are featured in world-class museums. Notably, conflicts surrounding

67. Victimless Leather: A Prototype of Stitch-less Jacket Grown in a Technoscientific
“Body,” TISSUE CULTURE & ART PROJECT (2004), http://tcaproject.org/projects/victimless/
leather.
68. Helen Stoilas, MoMa Exhibit Dies Five Weeks into Show, ART NEWSPAPER, May
2008, at 1 (alteration in original).
69. Id.
70. Joy Yoon, The 15 Richest Living Artists, COMPLEX (Feb. 3, 2012, 11:27 AM),
http://www.complex.com/art-design/2012/02/the-15-richest-living-artists/damien-hirst.
71. See A Thousand Years, DAMIEN HIRST, http://www.damienhirst.com/a-thousandyears (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
72. Id.
73. See generally George Gessert, On Exhibiting Hybrids, CIRCA, Winter 1999, at S08.
74. Id. at S09.
75. Oliver, supra note 64, at 10. The ethics of creating art with living subjects is
fascinating but outside the scope of this Article.
76. Id.
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contemporary art and the fixation requirement are beginning to arise in
court.
D. Contemporary Art in the Courts
Courts are beginning to confront problems with the application of the
“transitory duration” limitation to renowned works of art. Chapman Kelley,
the plaintiff in Kelley v. Chicago Park District, is an artist known for his
representational paintings of foliage, particularly elliptical outlines
surrounding landscapes and flowers.77 In 1983, he was asked to install a
wildflower display in Chicago, Illinois.78 The result was Wildflower Works,
composed of two giant elliptical flowerbeds, approximately a football field
in size, featuring a wide variety of native wildflowers set within borders of
gravel and steel.79 Kelley selected between forty-eight and sixty species of
self-sustaining wildflowers for the piece, and he designed the initial
placement of the wildflowers so they would “blossom sequentially,
changing colors throughout the growing season and increasing in brightness
towards the center of each ellipse.”80 Kelley sued the Chicago Park District
for violating his moral right of integrity under VARA when the Park
District decreased the size of Wildflower Works to less than half its original
size, made the elliptical borders rectilinear, and replanted the wildflowers in
a smaller garden without his approval.81
This case, decided in February 2011, has important legal implications for
contemporary art. The court ruled that the carefully designed elliptical
gardens failed to satisfy the level of fixation required for copyrightability.82
It found that “[a] garden’s constituent elements are alive and inherently
changeable, not fixed.”83 Even though Wildflower Works could satisfy the
definition of fixation because it could be “perceived for more than a
transitory duration,” the court still held that it lacked fixation because its
essence was dynamic.84 The work did not vary minute to minute; instead it
“moves gradually, over days, weeks, and season to season,” but the nature
of the chosen medium precluded copyright of the final product.85
Surprisingly, the court found that the “barrier to copyright [was] not
temporal but essential. The essence of a garden is its vitality, not its
fixedness.”86 The Seventh Circuit seems to have invented this “essence
test” for its fixation inquiry, having provided no citation for this standard.
The parameters for the essence test are unclear, however, and offer little
guidance for future cases involving visual arts.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 292–93.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 294–95.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
Id.
Id.
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E. Lessons for Copyright
What lessons do we learn from looking at the above examples of
contemporary art? First, we learn that this sort of art is not marginal but
instead represents a dominant current in contemporary art, recognized by
artists and consumers of art, judges of the Turner Prize and the MacArthur
grants, as well as renowned art museums worldwide, such as the MoMA,
the Whitney, and the Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art. This is
not some trifling around at the fringes but instead a movement at the heart
of contemporary creativity. The renown of the artists and movements
involved in particular demonstrate that U.S. copyright law is moving further
and further from its core function by requiring that works not contain
transitory elements to establish basic copyrightability. Fine art surely
comes within the core of that which copyright is meant to encourage, and
yet entire schools of art, including some of the most acclaimed
contemporary artists of our time, cannot qualify for copyright protection
(while works such as this paragraph do).
While the focus of our research has been on recent art, lions of twentieth
century art, such as Robert Rauschenberg and Wilhelm de Kooning, also
exhibited a broad conception of art that countenanced works with transitory
elements. Famously, Rauschenberg asked De Kooning for a drawing and
upon receiving it, began slowly erasing it over a period of weeks.87 The act
of erasing constituted the work.88 The fact of their participation in this
manner makes the claim that works of transitory duration are not artistically
significant even more implausible. Moreover, even if such works were not
important art, under the Bleistein principle, copyright should be equally
interested in protecting them.
The “transitory duration” requirement for fixation means that these sorts
of works per se will simply not receive copyright protection, while works
that do not have dynamic features will. The fixation requirement in its
current state thus serves a pernicious function. Other things being equal, an
initial policy prescription appears obvious: abolish the fixation requirement
so copyright law better protects new, unfixed forms of art. As mentioned in
the Introduction, the obvious question raised by this prescription is why
copyright requires fixation.

87. MARK STEVENS & ANNALYN SWAN, DE KOONING: AN AMERICAN MASTER 359
(2004) (“Rauchenberg . . . asked [De Kooning] if he might have a drawing. That in itself
was not unusual . . . . But Rauschenberg wanted the drawing not to hang in his studio, but to
erase . . . . [De Kooning] told Rauschenberg: ‘I know what you’re doing.’ . . . The young
artist was engaged in a symbolic act of generational and Oedipal murder, at once comic and
deadly serious. He was ridding himself of a burdensome father. He was doing so, moreover,
in the joking language of Dada, a movement that did not respect the sanctity of the art object
or celebrate the romantic passion of de Kooning’s generation.”).
88. Id.
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II. PURPOSES OF THE FIXATION REQUIREMENT
In this Part, we examine the origins of the fixation requirement and the
rationales supporting it. Common justifications for the fixation requirement
include claims that fixation is a constitutional requirement, as well as the
use of fixation as a check on the capaciousness of the originality
requirement, and fixation as an evidentiary tool. We conclude that the
proper function of fixation will be equally supported, and the purposes of
copyright more effectively served, if the “transitory duration” language is
stricken from the statute.
A. Fixation As a Constitutional Requirement
Numerous courts and commentators have seen fixation as a constitutional
requirement, based on the language in Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, which allows Congress to provide copyright for writings of
authors.89 Many have argued that the notion of a “writing” necessarily
implies a work that is “fixed.”90 While the presence of a fixation
requirement is often assumed, fixation de jure did not exist prior to the 1976
Act.91 In other words, the U.S. copyright system functioned without the
fixation requirement for nearly the first two centuries of its existence. From
the first U.S. Copyright Act of 1790 through amendments to the 1909 Act,
fixation was, however, a de facto, if not incidental, aspect of copyright law,
through both subject matter and formality requirements.92 In 1790, the only
works that were protected under the Copyright Act were maps, charts, and
books, all of which were fixed automatically upon creation due to the nature
of the works.93 The 1909 Act broadened copyrightable works to include
“all the writings of an author.”94 At that time, fixation per se was not an
issue because federal copyright protection itself required acts that involved
embodying the work in some kind of physical form.95 For example,
copyright protection hinged upon publication with the required notice of
copyright affixed to the work and the deposit of a copy of the work with the
Copyright Office.96 The requirement to publish and submit a physical copy
de facto required fixation.
89. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
90. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303 (“‘Without fixation,’ moreover, ‘there cannot be a writing.’”
(emphasis added) (quoting 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 3:22
(1994))); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03B (2013)
(stating that unless a work is reduced to tangible form, it cannot be considered a writing).
91. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076
(including no fixation language); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (same).
92. See, e.g., Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 46 (1939) (discussing
deposit formality before and after 1890 Copyright Act revisions); Laura A. Heymann, How
To Write a Life: Some Thoughts on Fixation and the Copyright/Privacy Divide, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 825, 844 (2009).
93. See Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. at 125.
94. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. at 1076; Heymann, supra note 92, at 844.
95. Heymann, supra note 92, at 844.
96. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. at 1076. Copyright could be secured for work not
reproduced in copies for sale by deposit of an identifying reproduction of the work with the
Copyright Office. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW
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Discussions surrounding the fixation requirement first appeared in
legislative debate on amendments to the Copyright Act of 1909, although
no subsequent proposals were adopted.97 Proposed revisions suggested
removing the de facto fixation requirement for copyright registration (and
thus copyrightability), because the intended subject of protection was the
intellectual production of authors, whether or not that creative output was in
some concrete form.98 During the seventy-first Congress, the House of
Representatives considered a proposal to provide copyright protection to an
author’s work “in any medium or form or by any method through which the
thought of the author may be expressed.”99 Again during the seventyfourth Congress, the House of Representatives considered a proposal to
amend section 4 of the Copyright Act of 1909 to provide for copyright
protection for “all the writings of an author, whatever the mode or form of
their expression, and all renditions and interpretations of a performer and/or
interpreter of any musical, literary, dramatic work, or other composition,
whatever the mode or form of such renditions, performances, or
interpretations.”100
By 1965, revision bills were introduced in Congress that proposed
fixation language, recommending that “the present implicit requirement of
fixation . . . be made explicit in the bill, and that it be stated broadly enough
to cover ‘any new forms or media [of fixation] that may be developed.’”101
This idea took root in the text of the Copyright Act of 1976, which sought
to expand copyright protection to a larger class of works not previously
covered under copyright law.102 The fixation requirement was viewed by
Congress as one way of accomplishing this goal; Congress sought to
characterize fixation in “broad language” to eliminate “artificial and largely
unjustifiable distinctions” drawn between various works by case law under
the prior Act.103 Thus, replacing the publication requirement with a
fixation requirement enabled federal copyright law to reach a new class of
artistic works for the first time.
A catalyst for this change came, in part, from the Supreme Court’s
holding in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.104 There, the
Court held that player piano rolls, readable only by machine, were not
copies for the purposes of the Copyright Act, which at that time required a
REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY: STUDY NO. 28 COPYRIGHT IN
CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS 96 (Comm. Print 1961) (including a study by Borge Varmer).
97. See Heymann, supra note 92, at 846 (citing S. 3008, 88th Cong. (1964) (introduced
by Sen. John McClellan); H.R. 11947, 88th Cong. (1964) (introduced by Rep. Emanuel
Celler); H.R. 12354, 88th Cong. (1964) (introduced by Rep. William St. Onge)).
98. Id. at 844 (citing H.R. 6990, 71st Cong. § 1 (1930)).
99. H.R. 6990, 71st Cong. § 1.
100. H.R. 10632, 74th Cong. (1936).
101. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF THE
REG. OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965
REVISION BILL, pt. 6, at 4 (Comm. Print 1965) (second alteration in original).
102. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51–52.
103. See id. at 52.
104. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
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copy to be “in intelligible notation.”105 To address this problem, Congress
created a compulsory licensing scheme to compensate artists who
previously received no compensation for such mechanical reproductions.106
But the seed had been planted, and the 1976 House Report explained that
with the Copyright Act of 1976, “Congress did away altogether with the
‘artificial and largely unjustifiable distinction[]’ that made copyright
protection dependent upon the form of fixation.”107 That this was part of
the justification of the fixation requirement is ironic. Due to changes in the
world—the emergence of contemporary art and digital media that result in a
proliferation of works of “transitory duration,” in particular—the fixation
requirement now causes the precise result it was meant to remedy, namely,
drawing an “artificial and largely unjustifiable distinction” that serves to
preclude certain categories of works from copyright protection.
B. Statutory Fixation As a Check on the
Capaciousness of the Originality Requirement
Copyrightability has two basic requirements under U.S. law: fixation
and originality. While originality may be the sine qua non of copyright
law,108 the amount of originality or creativity required under U.S. law for
purposes of satisfying the originality requirement has a famously low
threshold.109 In a Berne Convention signatory country such as Switzerland,
for example, if a person simply pulled out her phone and took an offhand
snapshot of a random scene, this photograph would doubtfully qualify for
copyright protection.110 In the United States, however, this photograph
likely would qualify.111 Thus, the requirement gives a very wide berth to
105. Id. at 17.
106. See Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183, 1190 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
107. Carrie Ryan Gallia, To Fix or Not To Fix: Copyright’s Fixation Requirement and
the Rights of Theatrical Collaborators, 92 MINN. L. REV. 231 (2007) (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665) (alteration in original).
Despite inclusion of a fixation requirement in the 1976 Act, the bill did not contain a
definition of “fixation” and the broadcast industry raised concerns about its televised live
events. As a result, the current definition of “fixation” was added, including the provision
that a transmission is considered “fixed” if “a fixation of the work is being made
simultaneously with its transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
108. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“The sine qua
non of copyright is originality.”).
109. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (noting
that photographs are sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection); Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d
Cir. 1951) (“[T]he standards for patents and copyrights are basically different.”).
110. See generally Lisa A. Zakolski, Protection Under Berne Convention, 18 AM. JUR. 2D
Copyright and Literary Property § 202 (2011) (“The issue of the ownership of copyrights in
works created by a country’s nationals and first published in that country will be determined
under the law of that country, which is the works’ country of origin pursuant to the Berne
Convention and which has the closest relationship to the works.”).
111. See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60 (“These findings, we think, show this photograph
to be an original work of art, the product of plaintiff’s intellectual invention, of which
plaintiff is the author, and of a class of inventions for which the constitution intended that
congress should secure to him the exclusive right to use, publish and sell.”).
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what can be copyrighted. The fixation requirement cabins the writ of
copyright, as a range of original works would be copyrightable but for the
lack of fixation.
Professor Douglas Lichtman has argued that “the real purpose of the
fixation requirement is to narrow copyright’s purview.”112 In support of his
argument, Lichtman cites Falwell v. Penthouse International, Ltd.,113 where
the Western District of Virginia worried that including unfixed expression
within the purview of copyright would protect “‘every utterance’” and
“‘courts would be inundated’ with copyright claims.”114 An early leading
case on precisely this issue is Estate of Hemingway v. Random House,
Inc.115 Ernest Hemingway’s estate sought an infringement judgment
against A. E. Hotchner, Hemingway’s biographer, based on his writing
down in the biography the contents of discussions he had with
Hemingway.116 Hemingway’s estate claimed that there was a common law
copyright in the words Hemingway uttered during his conversations with
Hotchner.117 Although the New York Court of Appeals recognized that
common law copyright protection for “certain limited kinds of spoken
dialogue” may exist, the court declined to extend such protection to
Hemingway’s conversation because he did not “mark off the utterance in
question from the ordinary stream of speech.”118 The court’s remark
implies three claims: First, as far as originality is concerned, Hemingway’s
ordinary stream of speech colorably contains sufficient originality for
copyright protection. Second, this is perniciously overbroad. And third, a
copyrightability requirement mandating that such content be “set off” as a
work is thus desirable.
C. Statutory Fixation As Evidence
Perhaps the most compelling argument for the fixation requirement is
that fixation serves an important evidentiary purpose. As one author has
stated, “[O]ne of the most important reasons for requiring fixation . . . as a
condition precedent to copyright protection is to ensure that a copyright
claimant will be able to provide a court documentary evidence of the
copyrightable subject matter.”119 Without fixation, “copyright law would
forever be mired in disputes over the definition and boundaries of the works

112. Douglas Lichtman, Copyright As a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 722, 729
(2003).
113. 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981).
114. Lichtman, supra note 112, at 722 (quoting Falwell, 521 F. Supp. at 1207). While the
court in Falwell declined to extend copyright protection to the facts at bar, it noted that a
“cause of action involving an [unfixed] oral expression can be sustained under a common
law copyright theory” in narrow circumstances. Falwell, 521 F. Supp. at 1208.
115. 244 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1968).
116. Id. at 252–53.
117. Id. at 253 (noting that Hotchner wrote the text down, though not with the explicit
consent of the author).
118. Id. at 256.
119. VerSteeg, supra note 20, at 132.
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claiming copyright protection.”120 Professor Laura Heymann has further
suggested that fixed art provides a tangible form from which courts can
assess the originality requirement: “It is not enough for an author to
describe his creative process . . . rather, a court must be able to compare
what the putative author has created to what came before to determine if the
‘modicum of creativity’ that the court has required exists.”121
Copyright seeks to incentivize the creation of works in the public domain
by granting artists exclusive rights for a limited time. Justice Potter Stewart
stated that “[t]he immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”122
Arguably, commoditizing the creative process so that creators have property
rights in tangible goods (even if the works themselves are intangible) is
easier; fixation helps to define the metes and bounds of a copyrighted
work.123 Professor Wendy Gordon has stated that the fixation requirement
serves as a tangible boundary to intellectual property, which allows others
to interact appropriately with that property.124 She argues that if intellectual
property is not given boundaries that define the scope and parameters of a
work, and thus the demarcation between public and private property, fair
use of such works will be chilled.125
III. FIXATION WILL SERVE ITS PURPOSES WITHOUT THE
TRANSITORY DURATION LIMITATION
What, then, is the response to these arguments in favor of the fixation
requirement? This Article does not argue that the fixation requirement is
unnecessary for copyright law. Ironically, the importance of the fixation
requirement actually vitiates the need to exclude transitory works from
copyrightability. As a practical matter, most creators will embody their
works in some form, whether or not doing so is required for
copyrightability. A primary reason for this is that fixation is an inherent
aspect of many important categories of copyrightable works. Another
notable reason is that fixation often provides authors with a strategic
advantage in commercializing their works and in the context of
infringement suits.
Embodiment in a form for more than a transitory duration—classic
“fixation”—serves as a natural “end” to many works within the subject
matter of copyright, such as films, books, photos, music, software and
more. Along the idea-expression spectrum, fixation for many categories of
120. Gregory S. Donat, Fixing Fixation: A Copyright with Teeth for Improvisational
Performers, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1400 (1997) (“[M]ore precise limitations on ‘writings’
might be convenient.” (quoting CBS, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 1967)).
121. Heymann, supra note 92, at 853.
122. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
123. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1383 (1989).
124. See id. at 1383–84.
125. Id. at 1379–80, 1383.
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protectable works is the final step across the threshold of expression.
Perhaps the most obvious examples are paintings. An oil painting does not
exist until an artist puts it down on canvas. The idea for the painting may
exist in the artist’s head prior to the existence of the painting, but the
expression of the painting is the painting.126 The expression is the physical
object that can be viewed, appreciated, and sold. Likewise, books cannot be
read and films cannot be viewed until they are fixed. Indeed, paintings are
not paintings, books are not books, and films are not films until they are
fixed in a way that comports with the statutory requirements.
Note, by contrast, one of Andy Goldworthy’s works described previously
that does exist apart from being put down on canvas, so to speak. Unlike a
DVD of a commercial film—which Goldsworthy has made, as well127—the
video is not an instantiation of the work itself. The work itself is “fixed” in
exactly the way it is supposed to be for the art itself—using natural
materials that change over time—but that method of fixation does not
satisfy the terms of the statute, because it is of “transitory duration.”
Marina Abramović’s performance art pieces are fixed precisely in the way
they are supposed to be fixed—so precisely, in fact, that she can train others
to perform them for a retrospective at one of the most preeminent modern
art museums in the world. But they are not fixed according to the terms of
section 101 of the Copyright Act because they are of “transitory duration.”
Statutory fixation for many works provides a commercial advantage.
Works that have been embodied in tangible copies are easier to
commoditize (and distribute). When a copyrightable work becomes fixed
for more than a transitory duration, it becomes an object ready to be sold,
licensed, or consumed in the stream of commerce. If tangible evidence is
preserved, proving infringement is also much easier. These assertions
suggest that in most instances, creators, particularly commercial creators,
need no additional incentive to fix their works above and beyond the
reasons pertaining to how such types of works are created and channeled
into commercial markets.
A. The Constitutional Language Cannot Be Fairly Interpreted To Require
Fixation for More Than a Transitory Duration
Contemplate the pertinence of these considerations to the first rationale
set forth above that the requirements for fixation are based on the
constitutional requirement of a writing. There is a surprising dearth of
discussion related to the constitutional definition of “writings” and how
courts interpret this requirement under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8.128 It
has been suggested that “works of authorship” should extend to the full

126. Which is not to say that the painting, qua physical object, is the work either. The
work, per se, is the intangible creative element captured in pigment, linseed oil, and
turpentine on canvas.
127. RIVERS AND TIDES: WORKING WITH TIME, supra note 36.
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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constitutional boundaries of the term “writings,”129 but what those
boundaries would be is unclear.
Legislative history indicates that the phrase “works of authorship” is
“purposely left undefined.”130 Congress intended to create a flexible
definition result that would neither “freeze the scope of copyrightable
technology [n]or . . . allow unlimited expansion into areas completely
outside the present congressional intent.”131 Again, no clear explanation
exists as to what is “completely outside the present congressional intent.”132
Taking a markedly different approach than the spirit of this legislative
history would indicate, the Kelley court ruled that Wildflower Works did
satisfy “originality” but did not satisfy the “authorship” requirement of
copyright law.133 It found that Wildflower Works “plainly possesse[d] more
than a little creative spark,” so it met the threshold for originality.134 It
even clarified that “[n]o one argues that Wildflower Works was copied,”
and “an author’s expressive combination or arrangement of otherwise
noncopyrightable elements . . . may satisfy the originality requirement.”135
Although the court determined that Kelley did not copy the work and that
an author’s combination of elements was original, it still held that
Wildflower Works lacked authorship.136 As such, the court’s holding and
reasoning are simply not consistent. How the court could find creativity
without an author remains unclear.
The Kelley court elaborated that even though Wildflower Works was
expertly designed and planted with great thought, gardens could not be
authored because most of the form and appearance are due to natural
forces.137 The court explained that most of what we experience in a garden
is created by nature, rather than by a gardener:
Of course, a human “author”—whether an artist, a professional landscape
designer, or an amateur backyard gardener—determines the initial
arrangement of the plants in a garden. This is not the kind of authorship
required for copyright. To the extent that seeds or seedlings can be
considered a “medium of expression,” they originate in nature, and
129. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976). Some tangible embodiment has been
implicitly recognized as important since the beginning of U.S. copyright law. Supreme
Court opinions and congressional practice have seemingly interpreted the constitutional
word “writings” to necessitate a physical manifestation. Brian Danitz, Comment,
Martingnon and KISS Catalog: Can Live Performances Be Protected? 15 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1159–60 (2005) (citing 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 90,
§ 1.08[C][2]). A debate exists as to whether it is a constitutional requirement. Stefan
Hubanov, The Multifaceted Nature and Problematic Status of Fixation in U.S. Copyright
Law, 11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 111, 113 (2006). No Supreme Court decision has ever ruled
that fixation is explicitly required by the Constitution, and legislative history is inconsistent
on the issue. Id. at 113–14.
130. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011).
134. Id.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 304.
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natural forces—not the intellect of the gardener—determine their form,
growth, and appearance.138

The court also reasoned that authors of copyrighted works must be human,
concluding that works reliant on natural elements for their form accordingly
are not copyrightable.139
One of the first cases to consider what constituted “writings” was
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.140 In that case, the Court noted
that a “writing” could not be limited to the actual script of the author;
rather, copyrightability must focus on the creative expression and output of
the author, not the form of it.141 Thus, “writings” should “include all forms
. . . by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible
expression.”142 In light of copyright’s goals of encouraging intellectual
creation, the First Circuit has stated that the constitutional protection
“extends to any concrete, describable manifestation of intellectual creation,”
and works will only be ineligible for protection where they are simply
ineffable.143 More than a hundred years later, in Goldstein v. California,144
the Supreme Court reaffirmed Burrow-Giles and noted that the “writings”
requirement has not over time “been construed in [its] narrow literal sense,
but, rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of
constitutional principles.”145 The Court went on to say that “although the
word ‘writings’ might be limited to script or printed material, it may be
interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative
intellectual or aesthetic labor.”146 Thus, contrary to the facile claim often
made that the constitutional requirement of a writing would mandate
fixation, the opposite turns out to be true, namely, much interpretation and
commentary on this requirement suggests that it is to be broadly interpreted
to accommodate and encompass new forms of creative expression as they
emerge.
While the Supreme Court in this early case displayed the sort of broad,
policy-oriented mode of analysis necessary to refashion the role of fixation
in a changing world, Congress is arguably more wedded to the fundamental
importance of a fixation requirement that excludes transitory works. This is
best seen in Congress’s approach to “bootlegging.” Following the passage
of the Sound Recording Act of 1971,147 a void of federal protection still
remained for the live musical performances of artists. One could
surreptitiously record a copy of a performance and later sell it, a practice
known as bootlegging. Congress amended Title 17 of the U.S. Code by
adding a § 1101, separate from the Copyright Act (which is codified in
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id. (citing 2 PATRY, supra note 90, § 3:19 n.1).
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
Id. at 58.
Id.
CBS, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 1967).
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
Id. at 561.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
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Chapters 1 to 8 of Title 17), which provided for a new civil cause of action
for unauthorized fixation of, or trafficking in, live musical performances.148
Simultaneously, Congress also added a parallel criminal statute, codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2319A. Many commentators questioned whether a court would
find such a law, which gave copyright-like protection to a statutorily
unfixed work, was within the purview of the Constitutional requirement
giving protection only to “writings.”149
In United States v. Moghadam,150 the Eleventh Circuit rejected a
constitutional challenge to the criminal statute.151 Defendant “Moghadam
argue[d] that a live performance, by definition, ha[d] not been reduced to a
tangible form or fixed as of the time of the performance” and thus did not
qualify for federal protection.152
While declining to decide whether the fixation concept would expand to
encompass unrecorded live performances, the court went on to hold “that
the Copyright Clause does not envision that Congress is positively
forbidden from extending copyright-like protection under other
constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce Clause, to works of
authorship that may not meet the fixation requirement inherent in the term
‘[w]ritings.’”153 This holding leaves the door open for Congress to legislate
other copyright-like, quasi-copyright or sui generis protections for unfixed
classes of work. In dictum, the court expanded on quasi-copyright
protection:
Extending quasi-copyright protection to unfixed live musical
performances . . . actually complements and is in harmony with the
existing scheme that Congress has set up under the Copyright Clause. . . .
Extending quasi-copyright protection also furthers the purpose of the
Copyright Clause to promote the progress of the useful arts by securing
some exclusive rights to the creative author. . . . [A]lthough a live
musical performance may not have been fixed, or reduced to tangible
form, as of the time the bootleg copy was made, it certainly was subject to
having been thus fixed.154

While this statement is consistent with the current law that unfixed
performances are ineligible for federal copyright protection, the language of
the court clearly recognizes the value in transitory works and that the
fixation requirement may not fully further the promotion of the arts as

148. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 1999); 5
ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE
ARTS § 10:12 (3d ed. 2004); Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Anti-bootlegging
Provisions of Uruguay Round Agreements Act §§ 512 and 513, Imposing Civil (17 U.S.C.A.
§ 1101) and Criminal (18 U.S.C.A. § 2319A) Liability for Unauthorized Fixation of and
Trafficking in Sound Recordings and Music Videos of Live Musical Performances, 41 A.L.R.
FED. 2D 429 (2009) (summarizing cases discussing the constitutional validity of § 2319A).
150. 175 F.3d 1269.
151. Id. at 1281.
152. Id. at 1274.
153. Id. at 1280.
154. Id. (dictum).
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intended. In sum, the constitutional language cannot be fairly interpreted to
exclude transitory works from copyright protection.
B. To Use Fixation As a Gatekeeper for Originality Is Inapt
Now consider our response to the second argument, which suggests that
the fixation requirement adds value by curbing the effects of an overly
capacious originality standard. This is a suboptimal means to deal with
originality. If the originality standard is too broad, it should be directly
hemmed in to whatever degree is desirable. Seeking to address the low
originality threshold in the United States by means of fixation produces odd
results. For example, copyright protects billions of emails sent every day,
despite the fact that such protection is not necessary to achieve the goals of
copyright. The fixation happens as a byproduct of the fact that online
speech of this sort is fixed on computer servers simply due to how such
machines function, not because authors are encouraged to engage in
fixation due to the prospect of commercial gain. The court in Hemingway
worried that extending copyright protection to all speech would be too
capacious.155 But this is precisely the result in a world of ubiquitous text
messages and email. Meanwhile, the works of an important contemporary
artist such as Andy Goldsworthy go unprotected unless artificially fixed by
proxy. Clearly this odd and dysfunctional juxtaposition represents the
unintended results of old rules applied in a new context. The new context is
one in which people write brief but fixed messages by the billions without
the goal of promoting the arts and sciences, while contemporary artists like
Goldsworthy do seek to add to the world of original art, and do so very
successfully, but in a manner that leaves their works unfixed (at least as the
term is currently understood). Abolishing the fixation requirement
alleviates this odd juxtaposition in which Goldsworthy’s work is not
encouraged by copyright but random emails are.
One may counter this by arguing that abolishing the fixation requirement
solves the problem of underinclusion, but it worsens the problem of
overinclusion since more works would now be copyrightable. But the
originality threshold is a substantive culprit in both under- and
overinclusion.156 To use fixation as a gatekeeper for originality is inapt,
155. See Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 268 N.Y.S.2d 531, 537 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1966) (“Conversation cannot be catalogued as merely the cumulative product of separate
and unrelated individual efforts, but, on the contrary, it is rather a synthesized whole that is
indivisibly welded by the interaction of the parties involved. . . . In light of the interaction
which renders conversation indivisible, it is difficult to see how conversation can be held to
constitute the sort of individual intellectual production to which protection is afforded by
way of a common law copyright.”).
156. There are significant problems with the overinclusiveness of the originality
requirement as we have noted here, but the originality requirement ironically is
underinclusive, as well. While it includes within the parameters of copyrightability
countless emails and the Yellow Pages, courts have used the originality requirement to
exclude forms of realistic art, such as the hand-blown, glass-in-glass jellyfish sculptures at
issue in Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811–12 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The selection of the clear
glass, oblong shroud, bright colors, proportion, vertical orientation, and stereotyped jellyfish
form, considered together, lacks the quantum of originality needed to merit copyright
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because there are fixed works that have a very low level of originality and
unfixed works that have a very high level of originality. No rational or
proportional relationship exists between fixation and originality. Important
contemporary art that is unfixed simply makes this point in the extreme
because such work is at the cutting edge of creativity, as recognized
objectively by the art world establishment.157
C. Evidentiary Hurdles Provide No Reason To Disallow
Copyright Protection for Transitory Works
The evidentiary rationale for the fixation requirement posits that when a
work exists in a tangible, stable physical form, it makes evidentiary issues,
such as who owns a work and what precisely is the owned work, more
tractable.
Two strong arguments demonstrate that the evidentiary
justification is not persuasive. First, the degradation of the copyright does
not parallel the degradation of the work itself, provided the work was fixed
at one point for “more than a transitory duration.” Postcreation destruction
of an originally fixed work does not affect the status of the underlying
copyright in the work. In fact, there is no requirement that the first fixation
of the work (the “original”) exist in any form at the time of the infringement
or the litigation.158 Professor Lichtman has stated: “There is barely any
difference between a case where there was never any fixation at all, and a
case where there was a fixation that was destroyed before the relevant
litigation commenced. Yet that is exactly the line drawn by the modern
fixation requirement.”159
Second, the fact that unfixed works can be infringed upon also refutes
copyright exclusion for transitory works. To the contrary, only the
reproduction right requires the defendant’s activity to consist of
unauthorized “copies or phonorecords”; the derivative work and public
performance rights contain no such requirement.160 The House Report
accompanying the 1976 copyright revision expressly states:
The exclusive right to prepare derivative works . . . overlaps the exclusive
right of reproduction to some extent. It is broader than that right,
however, in the sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies . . .
whereas the preparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomime,

protection.”). Other forms of contemporary art that have their place well within the structure
of galleries and museums may also be excluded from the shelter of copyright law because of
the inadequacy of the originality requirement. Found art, a movement that began with
Duchamp’s readymades and derives meaning from the artist’s intention and context, is one
example. While a thorough explication of the meaning of originality in copyright law is
outside the scope of this Article, our argument is merely that to the extent there are issues
with originality, we should address them on those terms rather than using the fixation
requirement as a quick “fix,” if you will.
157. See supra Part I.
158. See Heymann, supra note 92, at 854.
159. Lichtman, supra note 112, at 732–33.
160. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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or improvised performance, may be an infringement even though nothing
is ever fixed in tangible form.161

Thus, a transitory dramatic interpretation of a novel may infringe the
derivative work right or the performance right without infringing the
reproduction right.162 What are these infringements if not works of
infringement?
To see another instance of the purported evidentiary value of fixation at
work, let us shift from high art to low art: consider a relatively typical
infringement case such as Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol
Publishing Group, Inc.163 The plaintiff in this case made very specific
claims regarding the defendant’s acts of putative infringement, including
that the defendant took a certain number of lines of dialogue from episodes
of Seinfeld.164 Now imagine a world in which there was no copy of the
plaintiff’s work to compare to the defendant’s putatively infringing book.
Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff had never filmed the television
episodes but instead had performed them live and had not fixed them via a
script or a video. As an evidentiary matter, the plaintiff would have a
harder time making out its factual allegations regarding access and
substantial similarity. For instance, the plaintiff might have to rely on
testimony of the performers or of the audience regarding claims such as
which lines were uttered by the plaintiff’s troupe.165
Two points are important to note here. First, the plaintiff would have a
harder time meeting the evidentiary burden of establishing an unauthorized
taking by the defendant than she would if the work were fixed. Indeed, the
burden would seem doubly difficult if both the plaintiff’s work and the
defendant’s work were transitory. This might occur if, for example, the
161. Tyler T. Ochoa, Symposium Review: Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is
Galoob a Mirage, or does the Form(gen) of the Alleged Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 991, 1001 (2004) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5657, 5675); see also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the definition of a
derivative work does not require fixation).
162. H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 53 (1966) (“[R]eproduction requires fixation in copies or
phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomime, or
improvised performance, may be an infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in
tangible form.”).
163. 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming the ruling of then Southern District of New
York Judge Sonia Sotomayor that a game that tested players’ knowledge of lines of
dialogue, characters, and plot elements from Seinfeld without the permission of the show’s
producers was an act of copyright infringement that did not fall under the fair use exception).
164. See id. at 138 (“By copying not a few but 643 fragments from the Seinfeld television
series, however, The SAT has plainly crossed the quantitative copying threshold under
Ringgold.”).
165. Relatedly, the archival rationale focuses on how fixation furthers the goal of
preserving expression. Lichtman, supra note 112, at 723. The claim is that because fixation
is durable and transferable, it increases the likelihood that the work will be passed from place
to place and generation to generation. Id. It further contends that fixation benefits society by
making works more accessible and long lasting. Id. Yet, these goals could be achieved
through other means, and fixation does not necessarily maintain the expression for a lengthy
period of time since it does not demand permanence. Id. Moreover, as argued above, even
without an explicit fixation requirement, there is a strong incentive to fix.
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defendant had instead engaged in a live performance based on the plaintiff’s
live performance instead of creating a book using Seinfeld material.
While such a situation might indeed present evidentiary problems for the
plaintiff’s case, it is the exception that proves the rule. This scenario is
unlikely to occur because, in the normal course of their creative endeavors,
plaintiffs and defendants of this sort will have reason to fix their works,
regardless of whether fixation is a requirement for copyright protection.
Doing so is a strategic business choice.
Thus, there will be less physical evidence for courts to consider in cases
involving transitory works. Evidentiary problems in litigation serve as a
caution to keep good records. However, these evidentiary hurdles are no
reason to disallow copyright protection. By analogy, if a crime occurs with
little evidence, a court would not deal with this shortcoming by denying that
a crime took place.
Fixation does serve an important evidentiary purpose, however, insofar
as it provides a method of discerning the parameters of a work. The
fixation requirement helps delineate an idea from its expression. For this
reason, we do not advocate eliminating the fixation requirement entirely,
but merely removing the “transitory duration” exclusion from the statute.
Removing the transitory duration exclusion would enable the fixation
requirement to separate idea from expression, but still extend copyright
protection to a class of works containing transitory elements. If the
transitory duration exclusion is removed, the parameters of a work would
be defined according to its “embodiment,” which “is sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated.”166 A fixation of a work in this context would be consistent
with the Burrow-Giles Court’s call for a “physical rendering” of some sort.
This term would appear applicable to, for instance, one of Andy
Goldsworthy’s works; we recast this as a requirement for “perception” or
“communication.” Congress could adopt a policy similar to France,167
Germany, Spain,168 Switzerland,169 the Netherlands, and other countries
where copyright protection is granted once the work is in a form that others
can perceive.170 A perception requirement would be a logical alternative
166. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
167. See CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE art. L111-1 (Fr.). An English language
translation of this is available at LEGIFRANCE.GOUV.FR, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (follow the
“Intellectual property code (legislative part, regulatory part)—pdf—451 ko” hyperlink).
168. See Revised Law on Intellectual Property, Regularizing, Clarifying and Harmonizing
the Applicable Statutory Provisions art. 10 (R.D.L. 1996) (Spain), translated in Spain,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=126674 (last
visited Mar. 25, 2014).
169. See LOI FÉDÉRALE DU 9 OCTOBRE 1992 SUR LE DROIT D’AUTEUR ET LES DROITS VOISINS
[COPA] [FEDERAL ACT OF OCTOBER 9, 1992 ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS] Oct. 9,
1992, SR 231.1, RS 231.1, art. 29, § 1 (Switz.). An English language translation of this law
is available at Documentation, FED. AUTHORITIES SWISS CONFEDERATION, http://www.admin.
ch/ch/e/rs/231_1/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
170. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT:
PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 232 (2013).
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because the copyright statute mentions works that can be “perceived” when
delineating the boundaries of copyrightable subject matter.171
D. Excluding Transitory Works from Copyrightability Fosters
Inconsistency in U.S. Copyright Policy
In addition, the present situation raises a fundamental problem for U.S.
copyright policy. Why should authors working in media that is unfixed by
copyright standards be better treated abroad than they are in the United
States? For decades, the United States has been a mecca of artistic works.
Incentivizing contemporary creators to work outside the United States
contradicts Congress’s goal to promote the arts and sciences by means of
the exclusive and limited rights afforded by copyright protection. Many
countries have copyright regimes that do not require fixation.172
Furthermore, no U.S. international treaty requires fixation for copyright
protection.173 The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988
recommended fixation but did not require it.174 If exclusion for transitory
works is not considered crucial enough to be included in such international
agreements, U.S. copyright should not require it either.
Indeed the same is true for individual U.S. states that do not always
require fixation for state copyright protection. Some states, such as
California, have enacted state copyright statutes that protect works that are
either not fixed in a tangible medium or works that are fixed for merely a
transitory duration.175 Other states, including Montana, North Dakota, and
South Dakota, have similar statutes that protect unfixed “products of the
mind.”176 Legislation under these statutes is limited, but lends support for
171. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Copyright protection is granted to “original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.” Id.
172. Civil law countries often grant copyright protection to a work once it is in a form in
which others can perceive it, regardless of whether it is also fixed. GOLDSTEIN &
HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 170, at 229. Additionally, Article 2(2) of the Berne Convention
leaves it to the different member countries to determine whether fixation in some form is
required for copyright protection. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works art. 2(2), Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3
(amended Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. Berne Convention Article 2(1)
states: “The expression ‘literary and artistic works’ shall include every production in the
literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression,
such as . . . three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or
science.” Id. art. 2(1) (emphasis added). It also states, “It shall, however, be a matter for
legislation in the countries of the Union to prescribe that works in general or any specified
categories of works shall not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material
form.” Id. art. 2(2).
173. Hubanov, supra note 129, at 115.
174. Id.
175. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1) (West 1982).
176. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-131 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-07-04 (2011); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 43-43-1 (2012). All three statutes are nearly identical; the North Dakota
statute reads:
The author of any product of the mind, whether it is an invention, a composition in
letters or art, a design, with or without delineation or other graphical
representation, has an exclusive ownership therein and in the representation or
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the proposition that a copyright system can function while including
transitory works. The California statute reads:
The author of any original work of authorship that is not fixed in any
tangible medium of expression has an exclusive ownership in the
representation or expression thereof as against all persons except one who
originally and independently creates the same or similar work. A work
shall be considered not fixed when it is not embodied in a tangible
medium of expression or when its embodiment in a tangible medium of
expression is not sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.177

The California legislature drafted the statute in its present form to avoid
preemption problems by clearly indicating that California common law
copyright protects works that fall outside of the scope of federal copyright
law.178
It seems the types of works brought in to copyright protection
under this statute are either extemporaneous—or semi-extemporaneous—
performances, or works not yet in their final form. A California appellate
court held, for example, that academic lectures are protectable as unfixed
works under California common law copyright.179 The court briefly
contemplated the challenges of determining unfixed works boundaries.180
Referring to the nature of professors to build and develop their lectures over
time while working for different institutions, the court commented that if
the common law copyright in the plaintiff’s unfixed lectures had to be split
up, it would be nearly impossible to distinguish which parts of the
plaintiff’s lectures were created during the plaintiff’s employment at UCLA
and what parts were created at another time.181
Another type of performance protected by the California statute is a radio
program broadcast but not simultaneously recorded. In Trenton v. Infinity
Broadcasting Corp.,182 a radio show creator and host argued that his on-air
performances were an unfixed work.183 The court disagreed, finding that
the radio station did record the performances for a sufficient time to create a
fixation under federal copyright law. But, the court said that if the plaintiff
could show certain individual programs were not recorded while broadcast
they would fall within the California unfixed works statute.184 An
unpublished and unperformed play was not fixed to qualify for federal
expression thereof which continues as long as the product and the representations
or expressions thereof made by the author remain in the author’s possession.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-07-04.
177. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1).
178. Lukens v. Broder/Kurland Agency, No. CV 00–08359 NM (JWJx), 2000 WL
35892340 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2000).
179. Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 545 (Ct. App. 1969).
180. Id. at 546–47.
181. Id. at 546.
182. 865 F. Supp. 1416 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
183. Id. at 1423–24.
184. Id. at 1425.
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copyright protection, but did qualify as an unfixed work under California
law. In a plagiarism suit under section 980, the court ultimately found no
substantial similarity between the play and the allegedly infringing
television show.185
The existence of such state statutes proves that a copyright system
without an exclusion for transitory works is feasible, even in the United
States. The fixation language used is consistent with federal law, so a
similar policy retaining the fixation requirement but extending protection to
transitory works seems reasonable. Moreover, section 301(b) of the
Copyright Act refuses to preempt state law that may protect an unfixed
work.186 Thus, works that are of transitory duration have been given some
limited rights in the U.S. system.187 Clearly, providing federal copyright
protection to the same works would be compatible with both the purposes
and the functioning of U.S. copyright law.
As the conventional understanding goes, the 1976 Act contained
fundamental changes in order to comply with obligations under the Berne
Convention.188 The most important conceptual change in the 1976 Act was
to move away from a formalistic system. It has long been a core feature of
the Berne Convention that due to copyright’s nature as a basic right of
artists, copyrightability cannot be made susceptible to formalities, because
the existence of formalities inevitably results in authors’ inability to secure
copyright due to a failure of some formal act or requirement.189
Accordingly, the 1976 Act brought big changes toward this end, including
doing away with the previous formalities necessary to gain copyright
protection, such as the registration and publication requirements
altogether.190 Designed in part to eliminate formalities, the 1976 Act
ironically first introduced a statutory fixation requirement.191 Because of
its emphasis on form over function in excluding works that contain dynamic
elements, the fixation requirement has become one of the most significant
185. Ware v. CBS, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 590, 594 (Ct. App. 1967). The court applied an
earlier version of the California statute, which at the time stated, “The author or proprietor of
any composition in letters or art has an exclusive ownership in the representation or
expression thereof as against all persons except one who originally and independently
creates the same or a similar composition.” Id. at 592–93.
186. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (2012) (“Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to (1) subject matter
that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
103, including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”).
187. For the two cases Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341 (N.Y.
1968), and Falwell v. Penthouse, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981), there were rights
of publicity statutes on point, but no state copyright statutes.
188. See Ancel W. Lewis, Jr., Bruce E. Hayden & Sandeep Seth, Recent Developments in
Copyright Law: The Berne Convention, 22 COLO. LAW. 2525, 2525 (1993).
189. See Universal Copyright Convention art. III, para. 1, done July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T.
1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 (entered into force July 10, 1974) (“Any Contracting State which,
under its domestic law, requires as a condition of copyright, compliance with formalities . . .
shall regard these requirements as satisfied with respect to all works protected in accordance
with this Convention.”).
190. Note, An Author’s Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1490, 1501–02 (1979).
191. See id. at 1495.
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formalities ever codified in U.S. copyright law. As has been discussed,
fixation is ultimately justified on a variety of practical grounds, and it is
precisely these sorts of rationales that the Berne Convention sought to
diminish in importance.
Considering all of the above factors, the rationales for fixation do not
amount to anything approaching a sufficient reason to deny the protections
of copyright to important categories of creative works.
IV. CASE LAW DEMONSTRATES THAT THE
TRANSITORY DURATION LIMITATION IS OUTDATED
The doctrine of fixation is becoming more complex and uncertain as
events in the real world overtake the law’s ability to adapt. A few recent
cases illustrate this rapidly increasing complexity. Fixation, which has
historically been a relatively uncontroversial doctrine in copyright law, has
moved front and center with developments in technology and the arts. As
media for creative expression have evolved, courts have wrestled with the
parameters of fixation—specifically, what it means for a work to be fixed
for “more than a transitory duration.” Cases in the areas of digital media,
performances, and conceptual art have all recently challenged the meaning
of “transitory duration.” These cases demonstrate that the transitory
duration limitation on fixation is increasingly outdated.
A. The Transitory Duration Standard Is Unworkable for
Digital Technologies
As computer technology has become faster and more ubiquitous, the
copyright exclusion for transitory works has come into question. Perhaps
the most notorious case to consider the duration needed for fixation has
been MAI Systems Corporation v. Peak Computer, Inc.,192 which
crystallized the fixation problem when considering “copies” in terms of a
copyright infringement action.193 The Ninth Circuit agreed with MAI’s
claims that maintenance by Peak was an infringing use of MAI’s protected
software.194 Because the software was loaded into memory, and a
technician could then view the error log and diagnose the problem, the court
held that the representation created in the RAM satisfied the fixation
The court noted that the Copyright Act requires
requirement.195
embodiment, “in a copy . . . by or under the authority of the author,” and
stability, “sufficiently permanent . . . to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration.”196 Relying on language from Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula
International, Inc.,197 the court held that the copy made in RAM was
192. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
193. Id. at 519.
194. Id. at 518.
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
197. 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984). The Ninth Circuit quoted the Apple Computer
court in support of its view:
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“fixed” under the Copyright Act.198 Building on Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software, Ltd.,199 the Ninth Circuit proposed that the act of loading
software onto RAM creates a copy under copyright law.200
More recently, the Second Circuit revisited the question of fixation as
applied to RAM technology and provided some (slight) measure of clarity.
In Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.201 (Cablevision II), the court
considered whether, by buffering data in a remote server, Cablevision was
reproducing someone else’s copyrighted work by making a copy.202 The
Second Circuit in Cablevision II took a different approach from MAI
Systems in determining a similar issue of electronic storage, reaching a
different conclusion regarding infringement and the creation of copies.203
The district court had agreed with the plaintiff’s reliance on MAI Systems,
finding that the temporary buffering of bits of data from the live feed into a
remote server (at the request of a customer wishing to record a program) at
a rate of 1.2 seconds before automatically being erased was more than a
transitory duration and that a fixed copy had been improperly obtained.204
The Second Circuit recognized the lower court’s attempt to focus the
issue using the two-step analysis from MAI Systems, but found that it had
mistakenly limited the analysis primarily to the embodiment
requirement.205 It distinguished the holding in MAI Systems, that loading
did create a copy, by emphasizing the need to consider the durational aspect
of fixation and that loading into RAM can create a fixed copy.206
Reasoning from Advanced Computer Services,207 the court held that the
works were not fixed in the buffers because they were not embodied in the
buffers for more than a transitory duration of time—no more than 1.2
seconds, in fact—before being automatically overwritten.208 The court
RAM can be simply defined as a computer component in which data and computer
programs can be temporarily recorded. Thus, the purchaser of [software] desiring
to utilize in his computer all of the programs on the diskette could arrange to copy
[the software] into RAM. This would be only a temporary fixation. It is a
property of RAM that when the computer is turned off, the copy of the program
recorded in RAM is lost.
MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 519 (quoting Apple Computer, 594 F. Supp. at 622).
198. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 519.
199. 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The act of loading a program from a medium of
storage into a computer’s memory creates a copy of the program.”).
200. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 519.
201. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
202. Id. at 125.
203. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 127–29; see Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
204. Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. at 621.
205. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 127 (“As a result of this error, once [the district court]
determined that the buffer data was ‘clearly . . . capable of being reproduced,’ i.e., that the
work was embodied in the buffer, the district court concluded that the work was therefore
‘fixed’ in the buffer, and that a copy had thus been made.” (citing Cablevision I, 478 F.
Supp. 2d at 621–22)).
206. Id. at 128.
207. Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356
(E.D. Va. 1994).
208. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 130.
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declined, however, to offer the 1.2 second duration as a benchmark to
measure the still amorphous “transitory duration” standard.209 While this
new analysis of the fixation requirement seems at odds with the MAI
Systems court’s holding, the Second Circuit determined that the MAI
Systems line of cases concluded that a copy was fixed without addressing
the duration requirement of the embodiment analysis.210 Thus, the court
reasoned, MAI Systems did not hold that loading a program into a form of
RAM always results in copying: “Such a holding would read the ‘transitory
duration’ language out of the definition.”211
Although focusing more on liability of an ISP in an infringement action,
the Fourth Circuit in CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.212 has come close
to providing a test for transitory duration. The court discussed the process
of creating the copies at issue, noting that the larger infrastructure of the
internet is designed as a conduit for data and within that automatic system
ISPs passively store material.213 The court held that the process of
transmission creates a temporary, automatic response and that those
electronic copies made during the transmission were not “fixed,” because
such copies were used to automatically transmit users’ material and they
were not “of more than transitory duration.” The court recognized that
transitory duration had both a qualitative and quantitative characteristic that
needed to be considered: “It is quantitative insofar as it describes the period
during which the function occurs, and it is qualitative in the sense that it
describes the status of transition.”214
A third case concerning digital fixation, Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc.,215
held that even a descriptive fixation would suffice for copyright
protection.216 The court stated that if something is “described in sufficient
detail to enable the work to be performed from that description,”217 then it
would be “fixed” for purposes of copyright law. In that case, “descriptive
fixation” was satisfied by the audiovisual display of the Duke Nukem game.
The court relied on ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg218 and analogized the rigid,
exact replication of the displayed information to transposing onto sheet
music in order for a musician to be able to sufficiently perform the same
composition.219 The court in Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin220 built on the
209. Id. at 129–30.
210. Id. at 128 (“The MAI Systems court referenced the ‘transitory duration’ language but
did not discuss or analyze it.”).
211. Id. (“Accordingly, we construe MAI Systems and its progeny as holding that loading
a program into a computer’s RAM can result in copying that program.”).
212. 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004).
213. Id. at 555 (“[Internet service providers], when passively storing material at the
direction of users in order to make that material available to other users upon their request,
do not ‘copy’ the material in direct violation of § 106 of the Copyright Act.”).
214. Id. at 551.
215. 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
216. Id. at 1111–12.
217. Id. (citing 1 PATRY, supra note 90, at 168).
218. 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that computer files on a CD are fixed in
a tangible medium of expression).
219. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1111–12.
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premise of fixation being satisfied by an identical, repetitive sequence. In
that case, database query results were fixed based on the rationale that the
output was repeatable when the input was identical.221
These cases demonstrate the difficulty of applying the fixation
requirement generally, and the transitory duration limitation in particular, to
digital technologies. From these cases, it is clear that there is a trend
toward a more flexible judicial interpretation of what it means to be “fixed.”
Nevertheless, it is also apparent that as technology continues to advance,
the courts will continue to be faced with drawing increasingly precise
distinctions between “fixed” and “unfixed” bytes of data. The sense of
permanence historically associated with fixation is inapt for many digital
technologies, and the question moves away from whether or not the work is
of transitory duration at all, toward a consideration of how much transitory
duration is acceptable for copyrightability.
B. The Transitory Duration Limitation Has Artificially Excluded
Live Performances from the Purview of Copyright
Unless Fixed by Proxy
Copyright law encompasses many kinds of live performances.222 These
live performances easily satisfy the minimal level of creativity necessary for
originality, but fixation has historically presented a stumbling block to
copyright protection. The medium of performance presents a problem that
is not easily addressed by flexible interpretation of the statute; instead,
courts rely on the second clause of the definition of “fixation”223 and let
either the transmission and broadcast of an event serve as an alternate
answer to the fixation problem, or force authors to fix their works by proxy.
Further defining this alternative to fixation in developing the modern
statute, live broadcasts are fixed “if the program content is transmitted live
to the public while being recorded at the same time.”224 This “workaround”
option of simultaneous transmission creates a legal fiction that (especially
when considering infringement) “fixation occurs before the
transmission.”225 The original work, however, never had any copyright
protection because of the lack of fixation; an unknown recording of the
original work therefore could not infringe the original unless a simultaneous
recording is made under the authority of the author.226
220. 136 F. Supp. 2d 276, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
221. Id.
222. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(3)–(4) (2012).
223. Id. § 101 (“[A] work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being
transmitted, is ‘fixed’ . . . if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its
transmission.”).
224. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665.
225. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg LP, 808 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
226. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 90, § 2.03[B][2] n.33; see also Prod. Contractors,
Inc. v. WGN Cont’l Broad. Co., 622 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that a
Christmas parade itself was not copyrightable, and the transmission of the event by a rival
network did not constitute infringement, but the rebroadcast of the simultaneous
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With the addition of choreography and dramatic performance to the 1976
Act as copyrightable subject matter, fixation’s emphasis on tangibility and
permanence remains a problem in seeking protection for those types of
works.
Because of the transitory duration limitation, fixation for
choreography, for example, involves recording the work either as a separate
audiovisual work,227 through photographs,228 or as a literary work in the
form of notations.229 These options for a creator enable a fixation by proxy;
the problem still exists that the actual performance remains unfixed, but the
newly created “fixation” is eligible for protection. The Second Circuit
came close in Horgan v. MacMillan to recognizing this dichotomy between
fixation and communication of the performance when responding to the
defendant’s argument that no infringement occurred because a “central
characteristic of choreography is movement.”230 The court held that the
photographs of Balanchine’s ballet infringed: “A snapshot of a single
moment in a dance sequence may communicate a great deal,”231 and
freezing the moment allowed for communication of the work into the public
sphere.
Choreography represents an internal copyright disagreement; the statute
with its reliance on a exclusion for works of a transitory duration suggests
that the work is only important insofar as it can be reproduced in the future,
but the language of being “perceived . . . or communicated”232 suggests that
a work is eligible for protection as long as some concept is expressed and
communicated regardless of how long that communication persists.233
C. Courts Struggle When Applying the Transitory Duration
Limitation to Contemporary Works of Art
In examining conceptual and process-oriented art,234 courts are still
fixated on the end-goal and the potential for a product to persist by

transmission, shown on ABC, would be an infringement because that work was protected as
both fixed and original).
227. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 632 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that dances are available for copyright
if they satisfy fixation).
228. Horgan v. MacMillan, 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986) (concerning a dispute between
the owner of a copyright in choreography and an alleged infringer that published a book
containing photographs of the choreography).
229. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 90, § 2.07[C] (“The preferable forms were
either the Laban system of notation or a motion picture of the dance.”).
230. Horgan, 789 F.2d at 161–62.
231. Id. at 163.
232. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
233. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION:
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF
THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY: STUDY NO. 28 COPYRIGHT IN CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS
96 (Comm. Print 1961) (“[D]ance must convey a dramatic concept or idea” (emphasis
added)).
234. Sol LeWitt, Paragraphs on Conceptual Art, ARTFORUM, Summer 1967, at 79, 80
(“In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work. When an
artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made
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reproduction. Courts wrestle with the transitory duration exclusion for
creative works that emphasize process over product. These creative works
may sometimes be seen as an ongoing expression of the artist or a
permanent expression of an idea—both of which traditionally resist
protection.235 Two modern cases, Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary
Art Foundation, Inc. v. Büchel236 from the First Circuit and Kelley v.
Chicago Park District237 from the Seventh Circuit highlight not only the
disagreement among courts’ approaches to the fixation requirement as
applied to these forms of creative works, but also the internal disconnect in
trying to show that these media of expression come within the purview of
copyright law.
In Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc., the
First Circuit considered whether an unfinished and conceptual work—
Christoph Büchel’s large-scale installation Training Ground for Democracy
for the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art (MassMoCA)—was
copyrightable under the fixation requirement.238 The First Circuit adhered
to precedent in concluding that the unfinished work fell within the scope of
the Copyright Act.239 Although the court saw the narrowly defined VARA
rights as just compensation for the artist, they ignored the fundamental
disagreement about the work itself; for the artist the work of art exists as
soon as it is expressed into an experience (for public viewing), but in the
eyes of the law art is only recognized after the artist steps away from it.240
The Seventh Circuit, however, in evaluating Chapman Kelley’s
Wildflower Works project, focused on the transitory duration limitation in
terms of copyrightability;241 its decision highlights an internal confusion
with the comparison to artist Jeff Koons’s plant-based sculpture Puppy.
While holding that a “work” should communicate the fact that humans
actually produced it,242 the court stumbled in categorization of Kelley’s
beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine that
makes the art.” (emphasis added)).
235. Lily Ericsson, Creative Quandary: The State of Copyrightability for Organic Works
of Art, 23 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 359, 378 (2013) (noting that the guarantee of
copyright law is protection for the expression but not the idea); see also London-Sire
Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 170–71 (D. Mass. 2008) (“The Copyright Act
thus does not use materiality in its most obvious sense . . . . [I]t refers to materiality as a
medium in which a copyrighted work can be ‘fixed.’”); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and
Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1195–96 (2007).
236. 593 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2010).
237. 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
238. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc., 593 F.3d at 41–42; see also
Michael J. Madison, The End of the Work As We Know It, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 342
(2012) (“The law does not concern itself with trifles. In a related sense, a creative thing may
emerge as a work from early or preliminary effort, and in doing so it crosses a kind of
copyright boundary.”).
239. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc., 593 F.3d at 51–52.
240. Cf. Madison, supra note 238, at 335 (suggesting that the fixation requirement is just
an outgrowth of the pre-1976 requirement of publication for protection).
241. Id. at 350 (“The work is, fundamentally, something that we assume should remain
the same . . . across artistic disciplines . . . .”).
242. Id. at 351.
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artwork, which it called “infinitely malleable.”243 The court was skeptical
that the plaintiff’s work could be treated as painting or sculpture244 and
found that the fixation requirement precluded copyright protection for his
work. The “denial of copyright protection for works with an ‘essence’ of
‘vitality’”245 rests on the interplay of fixation and medium of expression;
fixation is defeated if the work is presented in a medium that is subject to
change.246 But the court contradicted its ruling when comparing Kelley’s
Wildflower Works installation to Koons’s Puppy, which it noted was fixed
even though the sculpture247 at each different exhibition site bloomed
differently and created a “noticeably different ‘Puppy’”248 at each new
location.
V. OTHER COUNTRIES PROVIDE A MODEL FOR A COPYRIGHT SYSTEM
THAT INCLUDES TRANSITORY WORKS
From the moral rights perspective ensconced in the Berne Convention,
the increasing complexity and uncertainty regarding the fixation standard
and the exclusion for transitory works can be seen as a formalistic legal trap
that will deny copyright protection to work that is otherwise creative,
original, and worthy of protection.
A. Copyright Systems in Civil Law Countries Often Function
Without a Fixation Requirement
The Berne Convention allows nations to choose whether to require
fixation.249 Generally, common law countries—such as the United States
and England—require fixation, while civil law countries—including
France,250 Spain,251 and Switzerland252—do not.253 Continental European
243. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 301.
244. Id.
245. Ericsson, supra note 235, at 382.
246. Id. at 381.
247. Id. (describing Koons’s Puppy as consisting of a wire fame, soil, geotexture fabric,
an internal irrigation system, and constructed on the exterior entirely of plants and flowers).
248. Id.
249. Berne Convention, supra note 172, art. 2(2) (“It shall, however, be a matter for
legislation in the countries of the Union to prescribe that works in general or any specified
categories of works shall not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material
form.”).
250. See CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE art. L111-1 (Fr.). An English language
translation of this is available at LEGIFRANCE.GOUV.FR, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (follow the
“Intellectual property code (legislative part, regulatory part)—pdf—451 ko” hyperlink).
251. See Revised Law on Intellectual Property, Regularizing, Clarifying and Harmonizing
the Applicable Statutory Provisions art. 10 (R.D.L. 1996) (Spain), translated in Spain,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=126674 (last
visited Mar. 25, 2014).
252. See LOI FÉDÉRALE DU 9 OCTOBRE 1992 SUR LE DROIT D’AUTEUR ET LES DROITS VOISINS
[COPA] [FEDERAL ACT OF OCTOBER 9, 1992 ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS] Oct. 9,
1992, SR 231.1, RS 231.1, art. 29, § 1 (Switz.). An English language translation of this law
is available at Documentation, FED. AUTHORITIES SWISS CONFEDERATION, http://www.admin.
ch/ch/e/rs/231_1/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
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civil law nations view copyright as a tool for protecting an author’s
relationship to his or her work.254 At the policy level, one reason these
countries do not require fixation is to give authors the right of
divulgation.255 The core principle is that authors have the right to choose to
keep their work private by withholding publication.256 Fixation as a
requirement is inconsistent with the core philosophy of French copyright
law. The right of divulgation often comes into play in situations where an
author’s extemporaneous or unfinished work is copied without consent.
Despite the absence of a fixation requirement, most civil law countries
require that a work exist in an expression to qualify for copyright
protection. An expression must be perceptible and display organization to a
degree that the work is more than an idea, but shows the author’s input. An
expression may be perceptible by a machine, rather than a human (such is
the case for computer software). In Germany, a work must exist in
perceptible form, rather than a material form.257 The broader concept of an
“expression” includes works that U.S. copyright law would consider fixed
for only a transitory duration. It also includes media that are stable enough
for the expression to be perceived sufficiently, such as ice sculptures, air
cutting, and hairstyles.258 A speech by famed psychoanalyst Jacques
Lacan, for example, was later published by a third party.259 The Paris Court
of First Instance held that the speech qualified for copyright protection once
it was made perceptible, here by spoken word.260 Thus, Lacan and his
assignees have the right to prevent others from fixing the speech.261 In
addition, the Paris Supreme Court for Judicial Matters found that
unauthorized photographs of a fashion show infringed the copyright over
the shows as performances.262 This decision was not entirely expected
because fashion shows fall within the category of choreographic works, and
the French code only protects choreographic works that are fixed.263
However, in interpreting the requirement, the court held that the fixation
was merely an evidentiary requirement for the infringement action, not a
prerequisite for the existence of copyright.264

253. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 170, at 229.
254. Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors’ Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and
Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 552
(2006).
255. Antoine Latreille, From Idea to Fixation: A View of Protected Works, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 133, 141 (Estelle Derclaye ed., 2009).
256. Id.
257. Elizabeth Adeney, Authorship and Fixation in Copyright Law: A Comparative
Comment, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 677, 682 (2011).
258. Piotraut, supra note 254, at 572.
259. Latreille, supra note 255, at 141.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Estelle Derclaye, French Supreme Court Rules Fashion Shows Protected by
Copyright—What About the UK?, J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC., May 2008, at 286 (providing
a summary of the 2008 case Roberts A.D. v. Chanel).
263. Id.
264. Id.
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A Dutch case addressed the contours of copyrightability and fixation
when it considered whether a perfume was copyrightable.265 The Dutch
high court held that the smell of the perfume was copyrightable, but not the
mixture.266 Lancôme defined the bounds of the perfume as that scent that is
inside the bottle.267 The court agreed that the scent inside the bottle is
sufficiently stable and objectively determinable to be perceived; that is not
to say that it is fixed for more than a transitory duration, as the smell moves
and changes, but the defined bounds of that scent in the bottle were
perceptible.268 The court noted some practical problems associated with
protecting works that are not perceptible visually or aurally. For example,
it is extremely difficult for an average observer to determine if one perfume
takes enough of the scent of a competitor’s perfume to find the Dutch
version of substantial similarity. The court contended that copyright law is
accustomed to dealing with these problems, pointing to computer software
infringement cases, which are highly expert dependent.269
These countries provide an illustration of copyright systems that function
without a fixation requirement. While our recommendation is to maintain a
fixation requirement to determine the metes and bounds of an artistic
expression, these countries demonstrate that it is possible to do so even
while including transitory works.
B. In Countries Without a Fixation Requirement, Fixation
Still Serves a Valuable Practical Function
In countries that do not require fixation for copyright protection, a
fixation requirement still serves a valuable evidentiary function. Often the
265. HR 16 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 327 m.nt. JH Spoor (Kecofa/Lancôme) (Neth.), available
at http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AU8940.
The
Dutch court found that the exclusion of works not perceptible visually or aurally was
unintentional, but widespread among nations. Reviewing English and French law, the Dutch
court noted that the realm of copyright is limited to works that are visually perceptible in
most other nations. This limit (restricting copyright to visually and aurally perceptible
works) is created by nations’ respective statutes that define the categories of protectable
works (for example 17 U.S.C. § 102). The Dutch version of this statute is not an exclusive
list—meaning things on the list are protectable, but so are some things that are not. The
Dutch court reviewed the legislative history and found that failure to include works that are
not perceptible by sight or sound was not an intentional omission, but merely a subject
matter that the drafters never contemplated, comparing perfume to video games.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id. The court also noted that perfumes mirroring naturally occurring smells
would not be protectable. For a fuller description of the standard of perceptibility, see supra
text accompanying note 265.
269. Perhaps part of the Dutch court’s ease in finding the scent of perfume protectable has
to do with the different standard of originality. Originality seems to be more of a limit under
Dutch law than it would be under U.S. law, although the court describes it as a low standard
and one that judges should not decide. The court seems to require a higher level of creativity
compared to the United States. The Dutch court states that industrially produced perfumes
would not be sufficiently original. Perfumes that are the product of individual creativity
would be protected. The Dutch court used phrases (roughly translated) like “carrying the
stamp of the author” and “owing its original character to the author” to describe an original
work. HR 16 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 327 m.nt. JH Spoor.
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only way an author can prove that an alleged infringing work is
substantially similar to a protectable work of the author is by producing a
fixation. According to one French law scholar, for certain types of works,
such as performances, a fixation’s evidentiary value is so important that it is
nearly a de facto requirement, although not a statutory requirement.270 As
discussed above, we argue that extending copyrightability to transitory
works would not have much of an impact on the tendency of creators to fix
their works. Countries without a fixation requirement can serve as a model
in this regard. Fixing a work in a form that is not transitory can be of great
practical value; however, works that are transitory in nature should not be
excluded from the purview of copyright.
VI. VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT AS AN
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
There will undoubtedly remain commentators who do not find the overall
benefit of removing the “transitory duration” exclusion sufficient to
outweigh the perceived negative impact of extending copyright protection
to a whole new class of previously unprotected works.271 As we noted
above, if removal of the “transitory duration” exclusion in the Copyright
Act is not justified, contemporary art should nonetheless receive
preferential treatment under U.S. copyright law via its moral rights
provisions.
A. VARA’s History Suggests That Courts Have Interpreted
Moral Rights Too Narrowly
The enactment of VARA, as an amendment to the Copyright Act,
introduced moral rights to U.S. federal law.272 Moral rights exist
independently of economic rights; they are personal rights that vest in the
author of a creative work.273 Unlike the rest of American copyright law,
moral rights are not linked to economic interests, but rather focus on the
intrinsic nature and cultural value of art.274
VARA grants to the author of a “work of visual art” the moral rights of
attribution and integrity.275 The right of attribution ensures both that artists
are correctly identified with the works of art that they create, and that they
can disclaim authorship of works that are not theirs or that have been
distorted, mutilated, or otherwise modified in such a way that would be

270. Piotraut, supra note 254, at 573.
271. E.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 489–
90 (2004).
272. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5128,
5128–33 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (2012)).
273. Robert J. Sherman, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists Burned
Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 373 (1995).
274. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (1995).
275. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
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prejudicial to their honor or reputation.276 The right to integrity allows an
artist to prevent or claim damages for (1) an intentional distortion,
mutilation, or modification of a work that would be prejudicial to the
artist’s honor or reputation, or (2) an intentional or grossly negligent
destruction of a work of recognized stature.277 While there are certain
limitations on the works and the artists that are covered by the statute,
VARA seeks to protect both reputations of certain visual artists and the
works that they create.278
Works of visual arts are granted additional protection because of the
unique character of such art and the special societal purpose served by such
works. While other copyrightable material can be copied and reproduced,
works of visual art exist only in the original; thus, the original is justified in
earning special privileges.
[T]he works of visual art covered by H.R. 2690 are limited to originals:
works created in single copies or in limited editions. They are generally
not physically transformed to suit the purposes of different markets.
Further, when an original of a work of visual art is modified or destroyed,
it cannot be replaced. This is not the case when one copy of a work
produced in potentially unlimited copies is altered.279

Therefore, Congress’s intent was to grant additional rights to works that
have the risk of being irrevocably lost if the original is damaged, altered, or
destroyed, as opposed to a mass-produced work that is not similarly
vulnerable.280 Moreover, Congress recognized that visual arts meet a

276. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6915. As
delineated by § 106A:
(a) Rights of Attribution and Integrity.—Subject to section 107 and independent
of the exclusive rights provided in section 106, the author of a work of visual art—
(1) shall have the right—
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of
visual art which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of
the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have the right—
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification
of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification
of that work is a violation of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any
intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation
of that right.
277. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2).
278. For example, VARA limits protections to “works of visual art,” as defined in section
101 of the Copyright Act. In addition, some VARA protections are only available to works
“of recognized stature.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 6.
279. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 9.
280. Virginia M. Cascio, Hardly a Walk in the Park: Courts’ Hostile Treatment of SiteSpecific Works Under VARA, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 167, 188 (2009).
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special societal need; their protection and preservation serve an important
public interest.281 Representative Edward Markey elaborated,
Artists in this country play a very important role in capturing the essence
of culture and recording it for future generations. It is often through art
that we are able to see truths, both beautiful and ugly. Therefore, I
believe it is paramount to the integrity of our culture that we preserve the
integrity of our artworks as expressions of the creativity of the artist.282

As such, while Congress was initially reluctant to include moral rights in
U.S. copyright law, the genuine importance of such rights is recognized and
given some measure of weight.
The concept of moral rights is derived from the nineteenth-century
French concept of droit moral, wherein the personal intangible relationship
is protected separately from financial interests and ownership of a work.283
Moral rights derive from the theory of natural rights and are based on the
notion that “an author has the right to reap the fruits of his creations, obtain
rewards for his contributions to society, and protect the integrity of his
creations as extensions of his personality.”284
European moral rights laws are significantly more extensive than those
recognized in the United States.285 First, many European countries grant
artists other moral rights in addition to attribution and integrity, such as the
right of divulgation and the right to repent or retake a work at any time in
exchange for payment.286 Second, moral rights in most countries are
inalienable, unlike VARA in which moral rights can be waived and only
last during the artist’s lifetime.287 Thus, artists in other countries have
greater noneconomic rights to their work than they have in the United
States.288
Most civil law countries have long recognized moral rights and afford
moral rights protection in compliance with the Berne Convention.289 The
Berne Convention states in Article 6bis:
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of,
or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.290

Thus, the Berne Convention creates (1) the right to claim paternity of the
work and (2) the right to the work’s integrity.
281. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 5–6.
282. Id.
283. Michelle Moran, Quilt Artists: Left Out in the Cold by the Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 393, 399 (2010).
284. Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 266 (2009).
285. Id. at 268.
286. Id. The right of divulgation gives the artist the right to decide when and whether the
work is complete and can be shown. Id.
287. Id.
288. Moran, supra note 283, at 400.
289. Adler, supra note 284, at 266.
290. Berne Convention, supra note 172, art. 6bis.
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The United States was the last major industrialized country to join the
Berne Convention, and one of the reasons for this delay was debate over
moral rights protection.291 Subsequently, Congress did not provide explicit
protection for moral rights in the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, because it found that existing legal protection with other causes of
action such as defamation, unfair competition, breach of contract, and
violation of the Lanham Act satisfactorily met all obligations under
Berne.292 The Act was passed only after Congress determined that U.S.
copyright law would not have to be amended to meet the requirements of
Article 6.293 Two years later, VARA was finally approved when the
approach to moral rights was minimalist.
While the Berne Convention implementation prompted greater debate
about the rights of artists, efforts to enact artists’ rights laws had begun well
before that time. In fact, bills seeking to protect visual artists were
introduced in Congress in 1979.294 States even took action to protect moral
rights. California was the first state to statutorily protect artists, and it
passed the California Art Preservation Act in 1979.295 This was followed
by New York’s enactment of the Artist’s Authorship Rights Act in 1983,
and nine other states have since passed similar moral rights statutes.296
VARA has a very limited scope, and only certain types of visual art are
offered the extra protection of moral rights.297 As such, VARA does not
provide moral rights to all authors of works that are otherwise
copyrightable. The definition of protected art under VARA is a narrower
subcategory of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” that are eligible
for copyright.298
More precisely, VARA only protects works falling into the carefully
delineated and narrow category of “works of visual art,”299 which is defined
as:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture,
in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that
are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or
other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited
291. See generally Susan Stanton, Development of the Berne International Copyright
Convention and the Implications of United States Adherence, 13 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 149, 169
(1990).
292. See id. at 170 (citing S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 9–11 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at
32–40 (1988)).
293. Sherman, supra note 273, at 374–75.
294. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6918.
295. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (1995).
296. Id.
297. 5 PATRY, supra note 90, § 16:7.
298. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 301 n.7 (7th Cir. 2011).
299. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
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edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author.300

Therefore, the rights granted by VARA pertain only to certain physical
embodiments of works present in single copies or in fewer than 200 copies
if they are signed and consecutively numbered. Moreover, VARA excludes
certain types of visual arts from the purview of moral rights. It omits many
utilitarian and mass-produced works.301 Specifically, the statute explicitly
does not include:
(A)(i)

any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book,
magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic
information service, electronic publication, or similar
publication;

(ii)

any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive,
covering, or packaging material or container;

(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.302

Noticeably, the list of works that fail to qualify is much longer than the list
of works that are entitled to extra protection. Congress meant to distinguish
works of visual art from other media, such as audio-visual works and
motion pictures, due to the different circumstances surrounding how works
of each genre are produced and disseminated.303 According to legislative
history, Congress excluded these particular works because it did not believe
that the authors of these types of work would have the same type of close
personal connection to the work that painters or sculptors would have to
their pieces.304
The language of the statute also makes it clear that VARA supplements
general copyright protection. A “work of visual art” explicitly excludes any
uncopyrighted work;305 so, to be eligible for moral rights protection under
VARA, a work must first satisfy standards of basic copyrightability.306
Therefore, limiting the scope of the Copyright Act simultaneously
constricts the types of works available for protection under VARA.
For modern artists who work in dynamic media, this exclusion from
VARA protection is yet another blow. Not only do they lack economic
rights to their works, but the absence of that protection also necessarily
means they are devoid of any personal moral rights in their works. While
moral rights have been carefully and cautiously granted, intended only for a
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. § 101.
Cascio, supra note 280, at 173–74.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). Note that the statute does not apply to art.
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 9 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6919.
Moran, supra note 283, at 401 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 9).
17 U.S.C. § 101.
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 299 (7th Cir. 2011).

2266

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

very specific type of art, excluding valuable art that happens to be in a
potentially unfixed medium cannot be the goal.
In Kelley, the Seventh Circuit found that VARA’s scope was markedly
limited. It stated:
VARA’s definition of “work of visual art” operates to narrow and focus
the statute’s coverage; only a “painting, drawing, print, or sculpture,” or
an exhibition photograph will qualify. These terms are not further
defined, but the overall structure of the statutory scheme clearly
illuminates the limiting effect of this definition. . . . To qualify for moralrights protection under VARA, Wildflower Works cannot just be
“pictorial” or “sculptural” in some aspect or effect, it must actually be a
“painting” or a “sculpture.” Not metaphorically or by analogy, but
really.307

But the court’s rigid conclusion is not explicitly conveyed in the statute or
legislative history. The lack of universal support for such a severe reading
of VARA is illustrated by the ruling of the district court in which it found
Wildflower Works could be classified as both a painting and a sculpture for
VARA purposes.308 The language of the scant legislative history offers
more latitude than the Seventh Circuit indicates. Congress understood the
constantly evolving nature of art, so it created a somewhat flexible statute
and instructed the courts to “use common sense and generally accepted
standards of the artistic community in determining whether a particular
work falls within the scope of the definition.”309 Generally accepted
standards can vary at a particular time and can evolve, so this offers some
freedom for interpretation.
Importantly, the legislative history continues on to provide guidance for
what Congress intends to fall within the definition of “work of visual art”:
Artists may work in a variety of media, and use any number of materials
in creating their works. Therefore, whether a particular work falls within
the definition should not depend on the medium or materials used. For
example, the term “painting” includes murals, works created on canvas,
and the like. The term “sculpture” includes, but is not limited to, castings,
carvings, modelings, and constructions.310

Therefore, the plain language of VARA and the legislative history is not as
inflexible as the Kelley court interprets it to be. The legislative history
suggests that Congress wanted to protect general categories of art.311 For
instance, the examples of acceptable “paintings” and “sculptures” are
nonexhaustive, so Congress leaves room for other options.312 Furthermore,
the language discussing media and materials is crucial for contemporary
works at issue. The materials chosen, such as flowers, and animals are
307. Id. at 300.
308. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
29, 2008), rev’d, 635 F.3d 290.
309. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 11.
310. Id.
311. Cascio, supra note 280, at 187.
312. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 11.
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precisely what exclude them from copyright protection (due to fixation and
authorship issues), but the legislative history of VARA indicates Congress
wanted the opposite result.
Depending on how broadly Congress intended the words to be defined,
contemporary artworks may fall under the language of VARA if not
excluded because of uncopyrightability. The protected art, “a painting,
drawing, print or sculpture,” could potentially apply to works such as
Victimless Leather and other pieces composed of living matter because the
groupings are not finite, and the materials chosen should not determine
eligibility. This possibility indicates that VARA should not be a subunit of
copyright, but should rather be a separate inquiry altogether.
B. VARA Protection Should Be Offered for
Contemporary Art
VARA protection should be expanded to include various forms of
contemporary art, regardless of the chosen medium. This advance would
further the goals of the Intellectual Property Clause, would move to greater
align the United States with other countries, would underscore the
importance that Congress places on the value of visual arts to culture, and
would protect works that are otherwise vulnerable.
European moral rights laws are far more comprehensive than the limited
moral rights available in the United States, and this disparity seems to
undermine the underlying purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause to
promote the progress of useful arts.313 Moral rights incentivize creativity in
a way that economic rights simply do not. They both complement each
other, but each is important on its own. Since other countries offer more
moral rights than merely attribution and integrity, and they do so for a
wider range of types of works, it is not far-fetched for the United States to
broaden VARA protection and offer limited moral rights to a larger scope
of works under the visual arts umbrella. As Congress stated, “The theory of
moral rights is that they result in a climate of artistic worth and honor that
encourages the author in the arduous act of creation.”314 Thus, including
artists that work in dynamic media within the coverage of moral rights
would be consistent with the purpose behind copyright “‘[t]o promote the
Progress of . . . useful Arts.’”315 Encouraging the development of new and
inventive types of art would further the central goal of nurturing creativity,
and works that would otherwise fall under the language of the statute—if
not denied VARA protection because they are uncopyrightable—would
finally be included.
The rationale for statutory exclusions, that the artists in such works do
not have an intimate connection to the piece, is understandable for genres
such as motion pictures and audiovisual works; however, it is unfounded in
works of visual arts that simply fail to achieve copyright protection. While
313. Adler, supra note 284, at 268.
314. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 5.
315. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
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the work is currently uncopyrightable because of the chosen medium, the
artist still has a profound relationship to the work. As Andy Goldsworthy
states,
I enjoy the freedom of just using my hands and “found” tools—a sharp
stone, the quill of a feather, thorns. I take the opportunities each day
offers . . . . I stop at a place or pick up a material because I feel that there
is something to be discovered. Here is where I can learn.316

The artist is just as passionate and connected to the final product as if it
were in a more permanent form. Consequently, the exclusion from VARA
is unjustified.
Additionally, each congressional justification for additional rights for
visual arts applies as strongly to contemporary visual arts. Bioart and
temporary installations exist in only one form, that of an original, so they
have the same vulnerabilities as works of copyrightable visual art.
Furthermore, as Representative Markey recognized, visual artists benefit the
public by capturing aspects of the culture; consequently, preserving their
creative expressions is a worthy endeavor.317 Contemporary visual
artworks are similarly valuable to society, so they are equally deserving of
moral rights.
Moreover, moral rights may even be more important to contemporary
works than others. Postmodern art is more susceptible to forgery than
representational works, and it is more difficult to determine the difference
between the counterfeit and authentic works of contemporary art.318 Thus,
rights to paternity are crucial for artists to maintain the integrity of their
name and their work. Currently, the issues of copying are less prevalent
because there is less incentive to do so, but this could change in the future.
Additionally, pieces that gradually grow and evolve may eventually stray
from the parameters of the original idea or design. In such an instance, the
artist’s integrity is at issue and he should dictate the adjustments to the work
to maintain the original concept.319 In certain works of bioart, “the integrity
or wholeness of the piece is a developing construct, and the integrity of the
piece encompasses this motion and development in ways that are often
more difficult to anticipate than traditional moving sculptures.”320
As Congress has acknowledged, because of the limited nature of VARA,
it protects the legitimate interests of visual artists without infringing on the
rights of copyright owners and without undue interference with the
operation of the copyright system.321 Thus, including cutting-edge
contemporary works within such curtailed protections would similarly not
impede, or in any way burden, the current copyright system. But it would
have a greater symbolic effect as to the acknowledged value and
contribution of such works.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Andy Goldsworthy, supra note 33.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 6.
Cronin, supra note 6, at 251.
Oliver, supra note 64, at 6.
Id. at 10.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 10.
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CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the movements in contemporary art that emphasize
process over product, modern art is exploring new media of expression.
These advances are exciting and have been recognized for their value, but
copyright law currently fails to protect major strains of this visual art.
Excluding works that have transitory elements—through natural materials,
living or digital media, or aspects of performance—leaves many
contemporary artists without economic rights. Demanding copyright
protection as a prerequisite for VARA protection further disadvantages
modern artists by additionally denying them moral rights. This end result
runs counter to the central purpose of copyright law to promote useful arts.
Similarly, excluding works that use transitory materials violates the
Bleistein nondiscrimination principle by conveying the unstated message
that copyright law values it less.
As it stands today, copyright law and VARA leave many contemporary
artists without economic or moral rights. But, this end result runs counter
to the central purpose of copyright law: to encourage creative expression.
Because the current state of the law does not comply with its stated goals,
action must be taken. In encapsulating the preceding discussion the
following policy prescriptions appear appropriate.
First, Congress should expand the scope of copyright law. The
protections afforded by copyright law have consistently expanded since the
original Act of 1790, and Congress should act to broaden coverage once
again.322 Historically, as new forms of creative expression developed,
Congress extended copyrightability to reach these new types of media.323
Such is the case today. Contemporary artists are using new media that
involve dynamic materials, and Congress should change the language and
current understanding of the law to make such modern works copyrightable.
This goal could be achieved by eliminating the “transitory duration”
exclusion for copyrightability. This language is not necessary to the
copyright system, so Congress should eliminate such a requirement from
the copyright statute. As discussed, it is unnecessary to a determination of
the parameters of artistic expression. In addition, other countries do not
require it, and state copyright systems that protect unfixed works prove that
the U.S. system would function well without such a demand. Moreover,
case law leads to great uncertainty about the threshold necessary to satisfy
the “more than a transitory duration” requirement for fixation. The level of
stability required is unclear, and the Kelley court created an ill-defined
322. This is not to say, however, that copyright law is not overbroad in many other
respects. The low originality standard and narrow interpretations of fair use are two (of
many) areas where copyright law is overbroad.
323. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (“The history of copyright law has been one of
gradual expansion in the types of works accorded protection, and the subject matter affected
by this expansion has fallen into two general categories. In the first, scientific discoveries
and technological developments have made possible new forms of creative expression that
never existed before. . . . In other cases, such as photographs, sound recordings, and motion
pictures, statutory enactment was deemed necessary to give them full recognition as
copyrightable works.”).
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“essence test” that offers little guidance for future cases.324 Congress could
adopt a policy similar to Belgium, France, Brazil, and others wherein
copyright protection is granted once the work is in a form that others can
perceive, even if that perception involves change over time. A perception
requirement would be a logical alternative because the copyright statute
mentions works that can be “perceived” when delineating the boundaries of
copyrightable subject matter.325 Even the current definition of fixation
focuses on the perceivability of the work rather than offering much insight
into the necessary stability.326 Consequently, the “transitory duration”
language should be stricken from the statute.
Second, courts should interpret “fixation,” “authorship,” and VARA
language broadly. The task of deciphering the scope of the statutory grant
of copyright protection and VARA rights has been left to the courts in many
ways. Numerous core terms are left undefined, such as “works of
authorship” in the Copyright Act and “painting, drawing, print or sculpture”
in VARA. Legislative history suggests an expansive reading of each, so
courts retain a great deal of interpretive power. Further, much ambiguity
remains even in the language that defines crucial components like
“fixation.” Because courts have been entrusted with the power of
determining the breadth of the vague statutory language, they should do so
flexibly and according to the purpose of copyright. Thus, if Congress
chooses not to modify the Copyright Act, courts should respond by
furthering the stated goals of copyright by interpreting “fixation,”
“authorship,” and “painting, drawing, print or sculpture” more broadly.
As discussed, the limits of “fixation” have become blurred, and the
nebulous nature of that requirement allows courts great leeway in their final
determination. By conceptualizing fixation very broadly, that statutory
demand could, in effect, be eliminated. This result may be achieved by
interpreting the demands of “fixation” as being very similar to, if not nearly
equal to, “perception.” This would be reasonable because perception is
stated in the definition of fixation and also functions well as the rule in
other countries. Alternatively, courts could interpret fixation with even less
onerous standards. Therefore, if Congress fails to remove the “transitory
duration” language from the Copyright Act, the superfluous requirement
can be muted for all intents and purposes through court action.
Additionally, courts should interpret the scope of VARA, particularly the
definitions of “painting, drawing, print or sculpture,” more expansively than
they have in the past.327 Legislative history’s examples of the different
categories of visual arts are nonexhaustive, and it indicates that courts
should use common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic

324. See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 305 (7th Cir. 2011).
325. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). Copyright protection is granted to “original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.” Id.
326. Id. § 101.
327. See Kelley, 635 F.3d at 300.
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community to determine VARA coverage.328 These guidelines offer courts
significant interpretive latitude, so courts can, and should be, more
inclusive. Moreover, the chosen medium should not eliminate a work from
protection.329 The use of living matter does not undermine the suitability of
works for VARA coverage, so contemporary works have a greater
likelihood of earning moral rights. Because Congress intended for the
definition of “painting, drawing, print or sculpture” to retain some
flexibility, courts should offer works more leeway when considering
whether they fall within the realm of VARA.
Finally, VARA moral rights should not be linked to copyrightability. If
the boundaries of the current Copyright Act remain in place, VARA should
be expanded to offer moral rights to visually artistic works, even if the work
is not otherwise copyrightable. Legislative history and the district court in
Kelley indicate that contemporary works using live and impermanent media
can be “paintings” or “sculptures” of visual art, thereby falling within the
scope of VARA coverage.
Thus, eliminating the copyrightability
requirement from VARA would provide contemporary artists with some
protection. Moreover, the language of the statute suggests that isolating
VARA coverage from copyright protection would be a reasonable move.
Section 106A says, “independent of the exclusive rights provided in section
106,” so the VARA and copyrightability inquiries could easily be separate
considerations.330 Furthermore, equitabile concerns suggest that economic
rights and moral rights do not need to be an all-or-nothing scenario: if
works that include dynamic media are not granted copyright protection, that
decision should not eliminate valuable works from VARA coverage as well.

328. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6921.
329. Id.
330. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (emphasis added).

